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Abstract 
Electricity trading can bring down the costs of the EU’s transition to a 
competitive low-carbon economy, in particular by facilitating the integration of 
renewable energy from variable sources. Yet insufficient grid infrastructure and 
regulatory obstacles prevent the trading potential from being fully realised in 
northern Europe. While many interconnector projects are under development, 
various barriers are precluding the grid rollout from taking place on time. The 
European Commission’s energy infrastructure package is an important step 
forward to overcome these barriers. But the scale and urgency of the 
infrastructure challenge call for significant further progress. 
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Executive Summary 
The EU is committed to achieving a rapid transition to a competitive low-carbon economy. As 
reconfirmed in the European Council Conclusions of February 2011, the EU aims at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared with 1990.
1 An interim step towards 
achieving this long-term goal is the 20-20-20 targets, which set, inter alia, the binding objective of 
raising the share of energy from renewable energy sources (RES) to 20% of overall energy 
consumption. Increasing the share of electricity generated from RES (RES-E) is key to reaching this 
objective. Indeed, the National Renewable Energy Action Plans show that significant additions to 
RES-E generation capacity are planned all across Europe. In northern Europe – understood in this 
study as including the Nordic and Baltic states, Germany, the UK, Poland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium – a large part of this new capacity will be variable wind energy. Beyond 2020 there is still 
considerable uncertainty as regards political support for renewables, but in view of the huge potential 
of wind energy in northern Europe and with wind being a highly competitive RES, variable sources 
will continue to grow. As a result, the challenge lies in integrating variable RES-E in the northern 
European electricity grid, while maintaining the security of electricity supply and enhancing EU 
competitiveness. Investing in transmission can benefit all three pillars of the energy policy triangle and 
foster the security, sustainability and affordability (i.e. competitiveness) of energy supplies. 
The benefits of expanding transmission 
Originally, the main purpose of cross-border electricity interconnections was to contribute to security 
of supply. Interconnectors were built to allow for mutual support in case of supply disruptions, thereby 
ensuring the reliability of electricity supply. More recently, their role in fostering competition and 
other efficiency gains potentially related to cross-border trading has received growing attention. Given 
the ambitious renewable-energy targets of the EU, a new motive for interconnectors is emerging: the 
integration of electricity from RES. Notably, the case for increased interconnections is relevant in 
relation to the merit order effect of wind production (and that of other variable RES-E) on wholesale 
electricity prices. In deregulated electricity markets this exerts downward pressure on wholesale 
prices.
2 As increasing wind penetration results in fewer full-load hours for fossil fuel-fired power 
plants, it also reduces greenhouse gas emissions. In the longer term, however, as RES-E capacity 
expands, prices might become highly volatile. This may create problems for non-flexible capacity, 
because it cannot strategically target the volatile high-price peaks. In this case, interconnectors can 
play an important role in distributing peak production across Europe, thus flattening out peak RES-E 
production with the positive effect of reducing price volatility in specific (regional) markets. 
                                                      
* Jonas Teusch is a Research Assistant, and Arno Behrens is Head of Energy and a Research Fellow at CEPS. 
Christian Egenhofer is Head of the Energy and Climate programme and Senior Research Fellow at CEPS, as 
well as Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and Natolin in Warsaw, at SciencesPo in Paris and 
at the LUISS University in Rome. 
1 See Council of the European Union (2011). 
2 See Pöyry Management Consulting (2010). For a more holistic approach, see Philibert (2011). 2 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
There are three geographically-specific benefits associated with electricity trading between the Nordic 
area and other northern European countries. 
•  First, electricity trading can allow the use of Nordic hydro capacity to be optimised from a 
European perspective. Currently, this benefit is related to the fact that hydropower in the Nordic 
market can complement the thermal-dominated mix in other northern European countries. In the 
future, the flexible hydro capacity in Norway and Sweden will become more relevant with a view 
to integrating a significant amount of the variable renewables that are being built up in northern 
Europe. To some extent hydropower could replace coal and gas in balancing variable wind power. 
Electricity trading is also beneficial from a resource-efficiency perspective. For example, as 
hydropower inflows sometimes exceed reservoir capacity in Norway, exporting power during 
periods of high inflow may in these cases be the only alternative to spilling water. 
•  Second, the analysis of market developments demonstrates that developments are quite 
heterogeneous across northern Europe. Owing to the increasing share of low-carbon electricity 
with low marginal costs in the Nordic countries (mainly driven by additions in nuclear and wind 
capacity), which could result in excess capacity by 2020, power trading can be expected to exert 
downward pressure on wholesale electricity prices in other northern EU member states and may 
also decrease the costs of decarbonisation.
3 
•  Third, analyses conducted by the OffshoreGrid consortium (2011) show that the spatial correlation 
of wind is generally lower in the north–south direction than east–west. For example, correlation 
coefficients between the Nordic countries and Germany are quite low (44% for Denmark–
Germany, 6% for Finland–Germany, 30% for Sweden–Germany and 40% for Norway–Germany). 
By contrast, the correlation between Germany and the UK is 67%. As a consequence, north–south 
transmission infrastructure is particularly helpful for the integration of more wind energy in the 
northern European electricity grid and can contribute to reducing price volatility. 
The differences in price levels that continue to exist even in scenarios that assume significant additions 
to transmission capacity confirm the general case for more power trading in northern Europe. 
A balanced approach to RES integration includes a range of initiatives 
Increasing interconnector capacity cannot stand alone when it comes to exploiting renewable energy. 
Trading through interconnectors should thus be combined with the implementation of measures that 
enhance flexibility on both the demand and the supply sides. Responses to demand, for example, can 
encourage consumers to reduce demand during peak hours or to shift demand to off-peak times. In 
addition, such flexibility in demand can contribute to an efficient use of the distribution grid. On the 
supply side, more flexible generation, load management and electricity storage can help to balance 
variations in RES-E generation and in electricity demand. But it should be noted that transmission 
expansion distinguishes itself from ‘other options’ in that it is particularly beneficial from a market 
integration perspective. 
Potential for electricity trading 
This study reveals that there is insufficient capacity in the existing infrastructure for transboundary 
transmission between the Nordic market and other northern European countries. But barriers to trading 
are not limited to countries’ borders. The limited utilisation of interconnectors is also caused by 
internal congestion. Here, the public reaction to the division of Sweden into four price zones on 1 
November 2011 may serve as anecdotal evidence demonstrating how valuable explicit price signals 
are to alert the public of where real congestion exists and potentially trigger public support for grid 
                                                      
3 It should be noted, however, that this could come at the expense of power companies with a concentration of 
their generation assets in countries that have opted out of nuclear energy. Also, consumers in the Nordic 
countries will face somewhat higher prices in the short term – even though analyses suggest that “the price 
reducing effect of renewable generation is much stronger than the price increasing effect of new interconnector 
capacity” (P&T, 2010). THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 3 
extension.
4 It is acknowledged that transmission expansion is not the only option to increase power 
trading: new technologies can also be deployed to make better use of the existing grid. The analysis of 
new interconnector projects reveals that the debate is no longer centred on building classic point-to-
point interconnectors between two countries, but more and more attention is being paid to innovative 
solutions that allow, for instance, for the connection of offshore wind farms and the use of spare 
capacity for electricity trading.  
Barriers to investing in transmission 
New investment in transmission is hampered by a large number of factors, as analysed by the 
European Commission’s blueprint on energy infrastructure priorities of November 2010.
5 Using this as 
a starting point, the study discusses the economic, financial, political, administrative and technical 
barriers. The study does not deal in detail with the complex matter of financing, although the analysis 
of the benefits of interconnectors leads to the conclusion that financial support can be justified for 
projects with significant externalities. The well-known complicated and lengthy permitting procedures 
and the somewhat related NIMBY
6 issue represent important administrative and political obstacles. 
The study is somewhat optimistic about the classical political barrier to investing in transmission – the 
differential impact on prices. The reason is that the massive deployment of RES-E in many northern 
European countries and the resulting more dynamic differences in price will make it clearer that 
enlarged markets are a win–win situation in the long run. The effective unbundling requirements of the 
third energy package should further complement this situation. The study does not find any 
insurmountable technical barriers, but identifying the right level of standardisation with regard to 
HVDC
7 technology and offshore grid equipment would facilitate transmission expansion.  
Key corridors for northern Europe – Projects of common interest 
On 19 October 2011 the European Commission proposed a regulation on guidelines for a trans-
European energy infrastructure.
8 At the heart of the proposal are so-called “projects of common 
interest” (PCIs), which would benefit from streamlined and faster permit-granting procedures, 
improved cost-allocation procedures and access to EU funding through the ‘Connecting Europe’ 
facility. While the regulation only applies to certain “energy infrastructure priority corridors and 
areas”, with regard to electricity projects in northern Europe the definition is broad enough for almost 
all the relevant cross-border projects in northern Europe to be eligible in principle under the regime of 
“common interest”. Electricity projects would be prioritised based upon a methodology for analysing 
the costs and benefits for the entire electricity system, to be developed by the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). As the regulation foresees that regional 
groups would be in charge of identifying projects within each priority corridor, some bottom-up 
dynamics within a competitive framework are ensured. The effectiveness of the selection procedure 
also depends on the openness of the process to third-party project developers. One would imagine that 
each regional group has an interest in clearly identifying the benefits of a certain project to ensure 
having as many priority projects as possible. This could lead to some healthy competition. ENTSO-E 
could then weigh these benefits, taking into account the European perspective (with the support of the 
European Commission and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER). Some 80-
                                                      
4 Yet a recent study commissioned by Bundesnetzagentur (Frontier Economics and Consentec, 2011) points to 
potentially negative consequences arising from a market splitting up, as it might, for example, increase the 
market power of large electricity generators. 
5 See European Commission (2010b). 
6 NIMBY refers to ‘not in my backyard’. 
7 High-voltage direct current. 
8 See European Commission (2011a). 4 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
120 projects are expected to eventually receive priority status (ENTSO-E’s 2010 Ten-Year Network 
Development Plan (TYNDP) contained roughly 500 projects).
9 
Main conclusions of the study in light of the European Commission’s proposal on a trans-
European energy infrastructure 
1. Transparent discussion is needed about the challenges of developing a cost-benefit analysis 
covering the entire electricity system. 
Owing to the complexity of a true, European cost-benefit analysis – which has not been done before – 
it is ambitious to expect ENTSO-E to submit its methodology for an energy system-wide analysis only 
a month after the proposed regulation enters into force. It has to be clear that the results of a cost-
benefit analysis as envisaged in the European Commission’s proposal of October 2011 can only be as 
good as the assumptions. This is further complicated by the fact that the cost-benefit analysis would 
need to serve two distinct purposes. First, it would be the basis for the selection of PCIs; second, the 
cost distribution among transmission system operators (TSOs) (or other project developers) would be 
decided on the basis of these calculations.  
a)  Only if the basis on which projects of common interest are selected and the costs allocated among 
TSOs is agreed upon, can stakeholder and public acceptance be fostered. In particular, it is clear 
that the results of such a cost-benefit analysis vary greatly depending on the value attached to the 
various energy policy goals. While different options for integrating variable renewables exist (e.g. 
storage, supply- and demand-side responses), they do not necessarily serve the internal market 
goal as well as building interconnectors. These political choices behind a cost-benefit analysis 
have to be addressed – they cannot be solved in a technical process among experts.  
b)  With regard to setting European strategic priorities, a long-term approach looking 20 or 30 years 
ahead and assessing the long-term contribution that specific projects can make to EU policy goals 
is certainly justified. But for such a cost-benefit analysis, a coherent, long-term EU energy policy 
would be crucial. Here, the energy roadmap 2050 is an important stepping stone. In the longer 
term, a more honest discussion about member states’ energy mix can hardly be avoided. Trans-
European energy infrastructure does, of course, have implications for member states’ energy mix. 
An effective EU energy policy requires coordination of member states’ energy choices. 
c)  For the second purpose (i.e. cost distribution among countries) shorter time horizons are more 
appropriate, as it is hard to imagine that national regulators will be willing to accept cost-
allocation decisions that are based on a long-term cost-benefit analysis that necessarily includes a 
large number of ‘heroic’ assumptions. 
2. Effective governance of regional groups must be ensured. 
The involvement of regional groups as discussed in the proposed regulation is crucial. This holds true 
not only because of the challenges associated with a system-wide cost-benefit analysis, but also 
because of the need to ensure the support of all the relevant stakeholders. Only if the stakeholders are 
properly involved in the prioritisation process will they support the implementation of PCIs. 
Therefore, in the proposed regulation it would be desirable to further clarify the governance of 
regional groups, particularly the following aspects: 
a)  The process for identifying PCIs should be open to a large number of parties to present promising 
projects. This point stems from the sheer scale of the challenge of transmission investment that lies 
ahead. It implies that instead of relying entirely on TSOs, third-party project developers should be 
allowed to present merchant projects. To reduce administrative obstacles, it would be helpful if 
 
                                                      
9 According to Art. 2.3 of the proposed regulation, “‘project’ means one or several lines”, while the TYNDP 
works with a narrower definition of project. Nevertheless, at a CEPS workshop held on 28 November 2011, a 
European Commission official indicated that one would carefully assess the extent to which the project 
definition was circumvented to make sure prioritisation is not watered down. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 5 
merchant project developers could present the relevant exemption by the European Commission 
and the national regulatory authorities once their project has been identified as being of ‘common 
interest’. 
b)  A specific issue that could contribute to better governance of regional groups would be the 
involvement of European coordinators in the identification phase. In the European Commission’s 
proposal of October 2011, a European coordinator is only envisaged if a PCI encounters 
implementation difficulties (Art. 6). But what happens if a regional group cannot agree on PCIs? 
As a consequence, consideration could be given to amending Art. 6 and allowing European 
coordinators to become involved in the identification phase as well. There should be careful 
assessment, however, of whether this would add an unnecessary bureaucratic burden.  
c)  As all four of the priority electricity corridors foreseen in the proposed regulation are of relevance 
for electricity trading in northern Europe, it is clear that optimised transmission expansion can 
only succeed if the regional actors cooperate closely. It is up to the European Commission, ACER 
and ENTSO-E, which are all envisaged as participants in the regional group phase, to ensure that 
effective coordination among the groups takes place in practice. 
d)  The need for the close involvement of regulators already at the regional group stage as foreseen by 
the proposed regulation can hardly be overstated, given that regulators decide on the incentives for 
investment by TSOs. Regulators thus have to be convinced that the prioritisation of certain 
projects is indeed justified so that they are motivated to take the appropriate measures.  
3. Internal grid issues should not be overlooked.   
More than half of the projects outlined in ENTSO-E’s TYNDP are cross-border connections and this 
share is expected to increase to some two-thirds by 2030. Yet in practice, internal transmission 
capacity within European countries represents a substantial obstacle to more electricity trading in 
Europe. It is therefore important that the regime of common interest proposed by the European 
Commission does not just focus on cross-border issues, as these investments might become stranded if 
internal congestion prevails. The Commission’s proposal of October 2011 recognises this, but the 
point should be stressed further. As the proposal now enters the legislative process, it is important that 
this aspect is strengthened and not removed because of subsidiarity concerns.  
4. The scale and urgency of the infrastructure challenge requires significant further progress in the 
regulatory field well beyond establishing a regime of common interest. 
a)  Given the scale and urgency of transmission infrastructure development, it is vital to ensure that 
efforts to promote infrastructure investment are not limited to PCIs. In terms of regulatory 
incentives for investment by TSOs, a more holistic approach is needed, going beyond discussions 
on rates of return. Depending on the domestic regulatory conditions, investing in transmission may 
carry very low risks, since consumers pay for investments. The challenge rather lies in 
incentivising the right kinds of investments, with solutions crucially depending on the regulatory 
framework within member states, which should be predictable and transparent. More specifically, 
the regulatory framework for congestion management should encourage the investment needed for 
both RES-E integration and the completion of the internal market for electricity. Merchant projects 
for new interconnectors should have a fair opportunity for development.  
b)  To make optimal use of the new transmission infrastructure, EU-wide market coupling of day-
ahead and intraday markets is important and needs to be implemented by 2014 as targeted. As 
mentioned with regard to the first conclusion above, it cannot be neglected that this development 
has implications for member states’ energy mix. More coordination is therefore required to make 
certain that the regulatory frameworks are compatible (inter alia, renewable support schemes) in 
order to promote fair and efficient competition in a European power market. It should also be 
ensured that the capacity mechanisms that a number of member states are planning to introduce do 
not distort the establishment of an internal market for electricity. 
 6 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
c)  Another major regulatory challenge lies in integrating electricity balancing markets, as the 
traditional approach – i.e. performing balancing at the control-area level without sharing balancing 
resources – is not ideal in terms of either variable RES-E integration or the efficient use of 
available generation capacities. This will hopefully be achieved through the development of an EU 
code for balancing. 
d)  With regard to the development of an offshore grid, new models for cooperation among 
governments, TSOs and regulators are needed. Progress has to be made in terms of ensuring 
compatible support schemes for RES-E, among other things. The North Seas Countries’ Offshore 
Grid Initiative is an important means for making further advances on these issues.   
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1. Introduction 
The EU is committed to achieving a rapid transition to a competitive low-carbon economy. As 
reconfirmed in the European Council Conclusions of February 2011, the EU aims at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared with 1990 (Council of the European Union, 
2011). An interim step towards achieving this long-term goal is the 20-20-20 targets, which set, inter 
alia, the binding objective of raising the share of energy from renewable energy sources (RES) to 20% 
of overall energy consumption.  
Increasing the share of electricity generated from RES (RES-E) is key to reaching this objective. 
Indeed, the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) show that significant additions to 
RES-E generation capacity are planned all across Europe. In northern Europe, a large part of this new 
capacity will be variable wind energy. Beyond 2020 there is still considerable uncertainty as regards 
political support for renewables, but in view of the huge potential of wind energy in northern Europe 
and with wind being a highly competitive RES, variable sources will continue to grow. As a result, the 
challenge lies in integrating variable RES-E in the northern European electricity grid, while 
maintaining the security of electricity supply and enhancing EU competitiveness. Investment in 
transmission can benefit all three pillars of the energy policy triangle and foster the security, 
sustainability and affordability (i.e. competitiveness) of energy supplies. 
This study seeks to outline the benefits associated with new transmission projects, focusing on 
northern Europe. To achieve this goal, the study first reflects upon the conceptual basis and discusses 
criteria that can guide a European cost-benefit analysis in section 2. Then, the projected demand and 
capacity developments in northern Europe are analysed in section 3. Special emphasis is given to the 
question of the extent to which the Nordic countries can contribute to integrating variable RES-E 
generation in the northern European electricity grid. Based on this analysis, section 4 assesses the 
trading potential in northern Europe. Subsequently, section 5 looks at the economic, financial, 
political, administrative and technical barriers to investing in transmission. Section 6 reviews the 
latest, relevant EU proposals, namely the European Commission’s infrastructure package of 19 
October 2011 and the energy roadmap 2050 of 15 December 2011. Lastly, policy conclusions are 
formulated with a view to providing input to the discussion following the release of the related 
legislative proposals. 
The study does not compare the situation in northern Europe with other regions and does not seek to 
single out specific projects. Rather the objective is to shed light on the potential benefits associated 
with transmission projects and to identify the politically pertinent issues connected with transmission 
expansion. Northern Europe is understood as including the Nordic and Baltic states, Germany, the UK 
Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium. The time horizon of the study includes both 2020 and 2030. The 
study does not engage in any modelling exercise but is based upon a literature review (including 
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studies that incorporate modelling). The review has been complemented by a stakeholder consultation, 
conducted bilaterally as well as through two workshops held at CEPS. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
study follows the definitions provided in the relevant EU legislation.
10 
2.  Conceptualising the benefits of an expansion in transmission 
Originally, the main purpose of cross-border electricity interconnections was to contribute to the 
security of supply. Interconnectors were built to allow for mutual support in case of supply 
disruptions, thereby ensuring the reliability of electricity supply. More recently, their role in fostering 
competition and other efficiency gains potentially linked to cross-border trading has received 
increasing attention. Given the ambitious renewable-energy targets of the EU, a new motive for 
interconnectors is emerging: the integration of electricity from RES. This is also reflected in 
technological changes. The debate is no longer centred on classic point-to-point interconnectors 
between two countries, but more and more attention is being paid to innovative solutions that allow, 
for instance, the connection of offshore wind farms and the use of spare capacity for electricity 
trading.
11 
This section assesses what transmission expansion can, in principle, contribute to EU policy goals, yet 
it also explores what effects this may have on other relevant actors. Lastly, possible alternatives are 
discussed, i.e. measures that may have an impact on the need for transmission lines and which should 
be taken into account when doing a cost-benefit analysis. 
2.1  Contribution to the EU’s policy goals 
The RealiseGrid project, co-funded by the European Commission under its FP7 programme, has 
developed a methodology that enables the benefits of transmission expansion to be evaluated along the 
three dimensions of the energy policy triangle, namely competitiveness, security of energy supply and 
environmental sustainability (see Figure 1). While it is impossible in practice to clearly distinguish the 
impact a given project has on the different dimensions, the operationalisation is nevertheless helpful to 
identify the key challenges that arise from the development of a transnational infrastructure. 
The benefits in relation to the first dimension (i.e. competitiveness) materialise through congestion 
reduction, which facilitates more electricity trading. As network constraints are alleviated, more 
efficient generators can replace less efficient ones.
12 Apart from this substitution effect, RealiseGrid 
also identifies a related strategic effect, i.e. market competitiveness increases as opportunities for the 
abuse of market power decrease. These effects, resulting from the greater potential for electricity 
trading, can increase social welfare.  
                                                      
10 Transmission means the “transport of electricity on the extra high-voltage and high-voltage interconnected 
system with a view to its delivery to final customers or to distributors” (Directive 2009/72/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L 
211/55, 14.8.2009). Interconnector refers to “a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between 
Member States and which connects the national transmission systems of the Member States” (Regulation (EC) 
No. 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, OJ L 211/15, 14.8.2009). Congestion is understood as “a 
situation in which an interconnection linking national transmission systems cannot accommodate all physical 
flows resulting from international trade requested by market participants, because of a lack of capacity of the 
interconnectors and/or the transmission systems concerned” (ibid.). 
11 These new ‘interconnector options’ are discussed in section 4.3. 
12 It should be noted that the substitution effect is limited by the need to provide reactive power locally. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 9 
Figure 1. Main benefits of transmission expansion grouped according to the dimension of EU energy 
policy 
 
Source: L’Abbate et al. (2011). 
In terms of the security of energy supply, RealiseGrid points to two key benefits: increases in 
reliability and reduction of losses. While the reliability of the European grid remains quite high, 
increased interconnection capacity still reinforces security of supply as it increases the possibilities for 
backup in case of breakdowns. To fully reap the benefits of new infrastructure, however, grid 
expansion needs to be combined with regulatory progress (see also section 4.6). In this regard, pooling 
capacity through EU-wide market coupling of day-ahead and intraday markets will assist in achieving 
the goal of affordability and will support RES-E integration. In addition, effective cross-border 
balancing schemes will reduce the cost of balancing, although transmission system operators (TSOs) 
have to contract for adequate system reserves within their control areas.
13 The impact of new 
transmission infrastructure on grid losses is twofold. On the one hand, relatively speaking, new 
corridors usually reduce losses at constant levels of transit as a result of technological improvements. 
But since the very reason for building interconnectors is to allow for greater transit, losses in absolute 
terms will most likely grow. Cost-benefit analyses of transmission expansion thus have to monetise 
losses at market prices (Migliavacca, 2011).  
A key element of environmental sustainability is emissions reductions. Here, as noted with regard to 
the first dimension, new corridors benefit cost-effective supply sources, and not necessarily green 
energy.
14 Generally speaking, the impact might therefore be negative, for example if German coal 
replaced Italian gas (ibid.). But even if the emissions savings effect was positive, for instance if French 
nuclear energy replaced German coal, the lack of a European consensus on nuclear energy poses some 
challenges for a European-wide cost-benefit analysis that tries to take the emissions savings aspect 
into account (see also section 5.1).  
Increased transmission capacity can assist RES-E exploitation as destination markets for variable RES 
are enlarged.
15 This is related to the merit order effect of wind production (and that of other variable 
RES-E) on wholesale electricity prices. In deregulated electricity markets this exerts downward 
                                                      
13 In Germany, there is a common reserve system for the four TSOs, as there are no permanent, structural 
bottlenecks of the grid within Germany.  
14 As the power sector is covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), an effective ETS would increase the 
competitiveness of low-carbon power and make assessments of the impact new corridors have on emission 
reductions somewhat more straightforward.  
15 Integrating regions reduces volatility, as different geographical areas have different demand curves (ECF, 
2010a). Greater geographical spread means that the weather might equal out – an effect that potentially 
facilitates variable RES-E integration. A more integrated electricity market would allow the “balanc[ing of] the 
location of wind power over a larger region with respect to wind availability, thereby reducing the risk of having 
high or low wind situations simultaneously” (NEP, 2010). Along these lines, the European Wind Integration 
Study (EWIS, 2010), initiated by TSOs to ensure the successful grid integration of wind, concludes that the pan-
European electricity system needs to be strengthened to ensure improved utilisation of variable RES-E. 10 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
pressure on electricity prices.
16 As increasing wind penetration results in fewer full-load hours for 
fossil fuel-fired power plants, it also reduces greenhouse gas emissions. Yet in the longer term, as 
RES-E capacity expands, prices might become highly volatile. This may create problems for non-
flexible capacity because it cannot strategically target the volatile high-price peaks. In this case, 
interconnectors can play an important role in distributing peak production across Europe, thus 
flattening out peak RES-E production with the positive effect of reducing price volatility in specific 
(regional) markets. 
Importantly, RES-E integration has positive implications for the other two dimensions as well. More 
to the point, greater RES-E penetration can reduce import dependence on fossil fuels, thereby 
benefitting security of supply. In addition, such a development might reduce the market power of fuel 
monopolists and in that way contribute to the competitiveness goal.  
When evaluating individual projects, RealiseGrid stresses that a utility function should translate these 
aspects into monetary terms and eventually create a mono-dimensional ranking that enables the best 
solution to be identified. Nevertheless, as this section has already shown, “benefit evaluation is 
a...demanding exercise since for example some technical improvements (for Security of Supply) or 
pursuing policy objectives (integration of renewable sources) are difficult to quantify” (ENTSO-E, 
2010). Also, there is no clear hierarchy among different policy objectives. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, there is no consensus on a ‘European energy mix’, which is most evident with regard to the 
nuclear question. 
2.2  Effects on relevant stakeholders 
Transmission expansion has important effects on many stakeholders. If expansion plans are to be 
successful in practice, it does not suffice that the plans are in line with EU policy goals; multiple 
perspectives have to be taken into account. As emphasised by the California ISO Transmission 
Economic Assessment Methodology, a thorough cost-benefit analysis has to dwell on the implications 
of investment projects for consumers, generators and transmission operators as well as society in 
general (Awad et al.).
17 
Assessing the benefits and costs for these different players is challenging, as it depends on future 
demand- and supply-side developments.
18 It is important to note that increases in social welfare and 
the distributional effects associated with new interconnectors should not be calculated based upon 
historical price differences among countries. While such an approach can draw from a rich set of 
reliable data, the future distribution of benefits and costs will most likely look considerably different. 
In particular, it can be expected that owing to the deployment of variable renewables with low 
marginal costs, price differences will be more dynamic in the future. This should help mitigate the 
winner–loser conundrum that sometimes hinders the development of interconnectors (see Box 1).  
A comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of investing in transmission implies looking not 
only at the effect on wholesale prices and investment cost recovery through network tariffs. 
Transmission expansion may also have an impact on the costs associated with the provision of 
ancillary services, which are likewise recovered through network tariffs. This is of special interest to 
consumers, given that network tariffs constitute a large share of retail electricity prices. 
A further aspect that complicates cost-benefit analyses is the fact that the choice of different time 
horizons influences the results. For an effective cross-border allocation of costs, relatively short-term 
cost-benefit analyses are needed, as stakeholders cannot be expected to evaluate transmission benefits 
that may only materialise in the distant future. At the same time, the goals of EU energy policies are 
more long term, as evidenced by the 2050 energy roadmap. As a consequence, a one-size-fits-all cost-
benefit analysis is not feasible.  
                                                      
16 See Pöyry Management Consulting (2010) and for a more holistic approach, Philibert (2011). 
17 See also section 5. 
18 It should be noted that supply-side developments are, in turn, also influenced by the transmission investment 
decisions taken today.  THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 11 
Box 1. Distributional effects of interconnectors 
The classical approach to assessing the welfare gains resulting from investment in interconnections is 
looking at price arbitrage. Assuming stable price differences, the logic is straightforward. Increased 
interconnection capacity will allow producers in the low-price zone to sell electricity in the high-price zone. 
Social welfare is increased as long as the increase in producer surplus, consumer surplus and congestion 
rent exceeds the investment costs in transmission infrastructure. While this is beneficial for both countries 
in the long run, as the importing country can allocate resources away from power generation to more 
competitive sectors, and the exporting country can allocate its resources vice-versa, in the short run the 
distributional effects may create problems. Simply speaking, consumers in the high-price zone gain as 
prices fall, while consumers in the low-price zone will face higher prices. Conversely, producers in the low-
price zone gain as prices go up, whereas producers in the high-price zone would have to cope with lower 
prices. Those who think they will be negatively affected by the price effects may oppose the respective 
interconnection project. More dynamic price differences resulting from variable renewable or otherwise 
complementary energy mixes may render this logic more and more obsolete, as net trade between two 
countries may well be balanced while the value of the interconnector arises from gross trade. 
 
2.3  Alternatives to transmission expansion
19 
A cost-benefit analysis of grid extension needs to weigh the options compared with other possible 
measures that may have an impact on the extent of transmission expansion that is need. For example, 
interconnectors are not the only option to deal with the variability of renewable energy sources. 
Enhancing flexibility on both the demand and the supply sides contributes to RES-E integration as 
well. Responses to demand, to begin with, can encourage consumers to reduce demand during peak 
hours or to shift demand to off-peak times. On the supply side, more flexible generation, load 
management and electricity storage can help to balance variations in RES-E generation and in 
electricity demand. Also, transmission expansion does not necessarily imply the need to build new 
lines; it may be possible to upgrade existing lines with new technology. In short, assessing the benefits 
of investing in transmission in practice is a demanding task, because a vast array of different options 
needs to be considered.  
More generally, future technological developments may, of course, also have an impact on the 
competitive edge of investment in transmission vis-à-vis other options to integrate variable RES-E, 
notably storage, demand-side and supply-side measures. An analysis by the European Climate 
Foundation (ECF) suggests that storage is currently a very expensive alternative and it is thus “hard to 
see how seasonal variations will be handled without grid investment or substantially bigger 
investments in back-up plus fuel supply” (ECF, 2011). If RES-E integration was the only guiding 
principle underlying decisions to invest in transmission, such demand-side measures as demand 
response or an improvement in energy efficiency (or both) would reduce the need for transmission 
infrastructure (ibid.). But it should be noted that transmission expansion distinguishes itself from 
‘other options’ in that it is particularly beneficial from a market integration perspective. 
3.  Demand- and supply-side developments in northern Europe 
After a quick overview of the importance of electricity in the EU, this section analyses projected 
demand- and supply-side developments in the Nordic countries. Then market developments in other 
northern European countries are discussed. Special attention is paid to the extent to which countries 
are exposed to the challenge of integrating variable of RES-E into the network. 
                                                      
19 See also LBST et al. (2012). 12 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
3.1 Context 
The importance of electricity will rise in the future. In the EU, electricity generation and consumption 
are expected to grow moderately in the coming years. In the three scenarios of the IEA’s World 
Energy Outlook (see Figure 2), electricity generation is expected to increase by a yearly average of 
0.6%-1% between 2009 and 2035.  
The PRIMES reference scenario (European Commission, 2010a) estimates an annual increase of 
electricity consumption of 1.2% from 2010 to 2020 and 1% p.a. for 2020 to 2030. Consumption 
forecasts by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E, 
2011a) assume an annual rate of increase for the period 2011–20 of 0.6-0.7% (scenario 2020) and 
1.3% (scenarios A and B). Between 2020 and 2025, the expected annual increase amounts to 
approximately 0.8% (ibid.). 
Figure 2. EU electricity generation by IEA scenario 
 
Note: CPS = current policies scenario; NPS = new policies scenario; 450 = 450 scenario 
Source: IEA (2011). 
The growing importance of electricity becomes even clearer when looking at the share of electricity in 
final energy demand. In the decarbonisation scenarios of the European Commission’s energy roadmap 
2050, the share almost doubles to 36-39% in 2050 (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Share of electricity in total energy demand in the EU (%) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011c). 
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Table 1. Comparison of forecasts for electricity demand (TWh) 
  Denmark Finland  Sweden  Norway  Nordic 
Year  2010 ’20 ’30 ’10 ’20 ’30 ’10 ’20 ’30 ’10 ’20 ’30 ’10 ’20 ’30
Eurelectric    34 38 44 86 99 109 140 144 144 130 143 153  390  424 449
P&T  avg.  35 38 41 85 93 103 135 150 159 121 127 137  376  408 439
  Politics work  35 37 39 85 92 107 135 146 154 121 126 140  376  401 440
  Green growth  35 40 47 85 98 111 135 155 167 121 132 147  376  425 472
  Stagnation  35 36 38 85 86 90 135 145 149 121 120 119  376  387 396
  Supply worries  35 38 40 85 97 105 135 154 164 121 131 140  376  420 449
Sources: Eurelectric (2010) and P&T (2010). 
Technological innovation can either lead to an increase in electricity demand (if electric vehicles 
become commercially viable) or have the opposite effect (if new energy-efficient technologies are 
developed that decrease electricity demand). In the case of heat pump technology, it is not even clear 
what effect a specific innovation will have on electricity demand as “new heat pump technology is not 
only making electric heating much more efficient but also more competitive” (NEP, 2010: 112). It 
could therefore either decrease electricity demand – if existing installations are simply replaced by 
more efficient ones – or increase power demand if more competitive electric heating gains a greater 
market share. As 98% of Norwegian households already dispose of electric heating, the former 
development (i.e. decreased electricity demand due to efficiency gains) should materialise in this 
country. By contrast, Denmark’s electric heating share is largely irrelevant (5%). If anything, 
electricity demand stimulated by electric heating could increase there.
21 The effect that more 
competitive electric-heating technology would have on net electricity consumption is less clear in 
Sweden (with a current share of 33%) and Finland (22%).
22 Technological developments also affect 
the nature of electricity demand; they might, for example, enable electricity demand to become 
smarter and adapt to the supply situation. More flexible demand would facilitate the integration of 
variable RES-E. 
Political choices affect all of the above given that the regulatory framework has, for instance, an 
impact on economic and technological developments. In particular, electricity demand might increase 
to a lesser extent because the Nordic countries are especially committed to achieving improvements in 
energy efficiency. For instance, in its recently published energy strategy, which aims at making 
Denmark independent of fossil fuels by 2050, the Danish government (2011a) set itself the interim 
target of being among the OECD’s three most energy-efficient countries by 2020. Even so, electricity 
demand might actually rise as a result of an energy-efficiency agenda, since electricity could replace 
other energy sources, as illustrated by the example of electric heating in Denmark. In addition, without 
a global agreement on climate change the competitive pressure on electricity-intensive industry could 
be expected to be quite high and potentially lead to lower electricity demand, as trade-exposed 
enterprises might gradually shift their production outside the EU. Such a shift might occur irrespective 
of climate change policy taking into account more cost-effective factors of production (e.g. labour) in 
emerging economies. 
3.4  Current Nordic supply situation 
Figure 5 shows that the share of low-carbon electricity is fairly high in the Nordic countries. In 2010 
only 25% of the installed capacity was associated with fossil fuel-fired power plants (see appendix 1), 
and a large share of this was combined heat and power with a high level of energy efficiency and often 
using biomass fuels. Because of the relatively high marginal costs of thermal condensing power 
generation, the share of fossil fuels in the actual electricity generation was low (18%), as the 
                                                      
21 As district heating is very popular in Denmark, an interesting option might be to use electricity in district 
heating at times of electricity surplus. 
22 Electric heating share estimates as reported in Pakkanen et al. (2008). THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 15 
condensing capacity is mostly used in peak periods when electricity prices are high. Hydropower 
constituted 51% of both installed capacity and total power-station generation in 2010.
23 As a result, the 
Nordic generation mix is relatively well suited to integrate variable RES-E in the future electricity 
system since, in principle, both thermal and hydropower represent flexible forms of supply. 
Figure 5. Nordic net generation in 2010 (TWh)  
 
Source: ENTSO-E (2011b). 
Hydropower production is subject to major annual variations, however, depending on precipitation 
levels. In addition, the flexibility of hydropower generation crucially hinges upon the type of plant; the 
figures presented above include reservoir-based, pumped storage and run-of-the-river power plants. 
According to Statnett, 60-70% of Norwegian hydropower comes from mountain reservoirs, meaning 
that it is relatively flexible and can be generated quickly on demand – as long as precipitation levels 
are high enough. Even though reservoir capacity for the Norwegian hydropower system amounts to 
some 84.3 TWh (NVE, 2011), in periods of very high hydro inflow, water sometimes has to be spilt, 
because owing to grid limitations the generated power cannot be transported to consumers. While the 
technical potential of pumped storage (especially in Norway) is huge, for environmental reasons little 
may materialise in practice. Run-of-the-river plants, by contrast, have no or very limited storage 
capacity for water and thus represent a non-flexible form of supply. 
3.5  RES-E deployment in the Nordic countries 
While it is usually quite difficult to predict future capacity developments (see section 3.6), binding 
targets for renewable energy give a good idea about the RES-E capacity additions in the three Nordic 
EU member states up to 2020. An analysis of the NREAPs presented in Table 2 reveals that the total 
installed RES-E capacity of Denmark, Sweden and Finland combined would increase by 8,587 MW 
between 2010 and 2020. This is projected to lead to an increase in annual gross RES-E generation of 
almost 30 TWh. In addition, Norway has agreed to finance half of the 26.4 TWh of RES-E in the 
framework of the common market for green electricity certificates between Norway and Sweden that 
is expected to run from 2012 and to 2020. 
                                                      
23 The year 2010 was relatively dry in the Nordic countries; thus the average hydropower generation is higher. 
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Table 2. Nordic NREAP analysis  
   Year  Denmark  Finland  Sweden 
Sectoral RES target for electricity 
(% of gross final electricity consumption) 
2005 27  27  51 
2010 34  26  55 
2020 52  33  63 
Installed RES-E capacity (MW)  2005  3,919  5,260  19,453 
2010 4,614  5,010  20,912 
2020 6,754  8,540  23,829 
Hydro 2005  10  3,040  16,345 
2010 10  3,050  16,350 
2020 10  3,100  16,360 
Wind 2005  3,129  80  536 
2010 3,584 170  1,873 
2020 3,960  2,500  4,547 
Biomass   2005  777  2,140  2,568 
2010 1,017  1,790  2,683 
2020 2,779  2,920  2,914 
Gross RES-E generation (GWh)  2005  9,881  23,730  81,384 
2010 12,412  22,660  86,675 
2020 20,595  33,420  97,258 
Hydro 2005  23  13,910  72,874 
2010 31  14,210  71,249 
2020 31  14,410  68,000 
Wind 2005  6,614  150  939 
2010 8,606 360  4,793 
2020 11,713  6,000  12,500 
Biomass   2005  3,243  9,660  7,506 
2010 3,772  8,090  10,567 
2020 8,846  12,910  16,689 
Source: National Renewable Energy Action Plans. 
 
A closer look at the NREAPs reveals that the challenges the Nordic countries face in terms of RES-E 
integration differ considerably.
24 In 2020, most Danish RES-E generation (12 TWh) is expected to 
come from wind power – which is difficult to integrate due to its variable character. While the former 
Danish government (2011a) had already announced initiatives seeking to increase the RES-E share 
even further – to more than 60% of overall electricity consumption in 2020 (as opposed to the 52% 
target of the NREAP) – the new centre-left government has raised the level of ambition even higher. 
Denmark aims at phasing out all use of fossil fuels by 2050, without relying on nuclear power or 
carbon capture and storage (The Danish Government, 2011b).  
In Finland and Sweden, by contrast, RES-E generation is mainly based on non-variable sources, 
namely hydro (mostly conventional reservoir-based plants) and biomass. In addition, Finnish RES-E 
generation is planned to grow only moderately to 33% of gross, final electricity consumption in 2020 
(from 26% in 2010). The situation in Norway is not problematic because of the dominance of 
hydropower. In short, while there may still be regional (e.g. northern Norway) and local problems with 
grid capacity, integrating RES-E in what is already a fairly well interconnected Nordic market should 
not pose major problems. 
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3.6  The future Nordic generation mix 
Unlike in the exceptional case of renewable energy– where binding political targets allow for fairly 
precise forecasts – assessing future capacity developments is challenging for the following reason: 
[T]he overall capacity of the generation fleet in the coming years, and thus the mix and 
generation adequacy, is uncertain: no body or market mechanism – beyond TSOs’ generation 
adequacy reports and warnings which enhance market transparency – ensures an appropriate 
generation capacity to cover demand harmoniously. Decommissioning is a particular concern, 
as a power plant can be closed with no prior notice to the TSO. (ENTSO-E, 2010) 
Changes in the electricity generation mix can be caused by diverse factors. In the simplest case, old 
power plants are decommissioned because they have reached the end of their lifecycle and have to be 
replaced by new power plants. The Danish government (2011a), for example, estimates that a 
significant number of Danish plants will “wear out before 2020”. Similarly, the Finnish Energy 
Market Authority (2010) anticipates that 1,700 MW of condensing power capacity will be 
decommissioned between 2016 and 2023, as the plants reach an age close to 45 years.  
But even generation capacity that could still run for a couple of years might be phased out if it is no 
longer profitable. For example, high CO2 prices render carbon-intensive generation capacity 
uncompetitive and therefore drive it out of the market. Thus, the development in carbon prices is one 
important factor that has to be taken into account when assessing the future energy mix. As the carbon 
price is low at the moment (around €7 per allowance in December 2011) – and is not expected to 
recover any time soon – it puts only limited competitive pressure on carbon-intensive generation 
capacity. 
Another element of the EU’s climate strategy is therefore more relevant at the moment: RES-E 
deployment. Also, in light of the preference given to renewables, old conventional power plants that 
were intended to be operated as base-load plants are now to an increasing extent run as peak-load 
capacity. While many of the existing plants have already recovered their capital costs, their operating 
and maintenance costs might still be too high to be profitable at low load factors. In addition, coal 
plants in particular were not designed for this kind of flexible operation.
25 In some cases it might be 
possible to add renewable biomass to their fuel sources. 
Compared with fossil fuel power plants, hydropower capacity is usually more stable, because the 
plants have a life span of up to 100 years and their profitability does not suffer from high fuel or 
carbon prices; by contrast, this would only increase their comparative advantage vis-à-vis fossil fuel-
fired plants. While hydropower resources are largely tapped, capacity might still increase moderately 
as old plants are refurbished with new technologies. 
Nuclear energy constitutes an important part of both Sweden and Finland’s future energy mix. While 
there are no phase-down/out plans in these countries at the moment, another nuclear catastrophe might 
put this issue back on the table. The current legislative framework in Sweden allows for the 
replacement of the existing ten reactors (whereby capacity could be increased) (Government Offices of 
Sweden, 2009). Finland is expanding its nuclear capacity, with a fifth reactor providing a total 
electricity generation capacity of about 1,600 MW expected to go on-line in 2014 and there are plans 
to build new nuclear power plants that would be operational in the 2020s (Finnish Energy Market 
Authority, 2010). While the plans are still uncertain, both projects have received a positive ‘decision in 
principle’ by the Finnish Parliament. 
3.7 Estimates  of  Nordic excess capacity 
The Nordic countries are not traditional exporters of electricity to other regions. In fact, the energy 
balance of the Nordic countries was negative in 2009, with 7,880 GWh having to be imported 
                                                      
25 Mitigating effects, such as an increased rate of wear, decreased thermal efficiency and increased fuel costs due 
to more frequent unit starts, pose some technical challenges (Hesler, 2011). 18 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
(ERGEG & CEER, 2011).
26 The deficit for 2010 was even greater, amounting to 19,541 GWh 
(ENTSO-E, 2011b).
27 Nonetheless, three studies (NEP, 2010; P&T, 2010; BALTSO et al., 2009) 
suggest that there is – under certain circumstances – substantial potential for net exports, mainly as a 
result of the RES capacity additions discussed in section 3.5.  
An analysis of these studies (see appendix 2) reveals that a significant Nordic surplus crucially 
depends on the large-scale deployment of renewable energy in the Nordic countries (which is likely). 
It should be noted that Nordic countries would generally benefit from the introduction of European-
wide green certificate trading, as their renewables are highly competitive. Obviously, the magnitude of 
the net trade balance does hinge upon uncertain developments in demand. While most sources predict 
moderate growth in demand in the coming years, this could change because of macroeconomic, 
technological or political developments. Non-renewable capacity developments also matter. Here in 
particular the phase-out of old thermal generation capacity in Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and the 
future of nuclear energy in Finland and Sweden, have to be mentioned. Taking these uncertainties into 
account, the estimates for the trade balance in Nordic electricity in 2020 range from -7 TWh to +46 
TWh. With regard to 2030, estimates range from -7 TWh to 22 TWh. The maximum export potential 
would correspond to more than 10% of projected Nordic electricity consumption in 2020 and 5% in 
2030. The Nordic countries would only be net electricity importers in a scenario where Sweden 
decides to phase down its nuclear capacity.  
3.8  Market developments in other northern European countries 
This section sums up market developments in other northern European countries, namely Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, the Baltic countries and the UK. A more in-depth discussion is 
provided in appendix 3. 
The challenge of variable RES-E integration differs considerably among these other northern 
European countries. While variable RES-E capacity is expected to represent more than 50% of 
projected peak demand in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, it is of only minor relevance in the 
Baltic countries and Poland (see appendix, Table 7).  
General developments in the electricity market are similarly heterogeneous. An analysis of various 
national sources reveals that there are concerns that Germany, the UK and Belgium will be short of 
electricity unless significant additional investment in local, flexible forms of generation capacity takes 
place. Owing to the large share of variable RES-E foreseen for these countries, investment in 
generation capacity might be hard to attract. These countries are currently debating the introduction of 
capacity mechanisms. 
The Netherlands, by contrast, is building up significant conventional capacity and the Dutch TSO 
expects the Netherlands to export electricity in the future, identifying post-nuclear phase-out Germany 
as a major destination market. With regard to Poland and the Baltic countries, variable RES-E will not 
play such an important role. Poland’s future electricity balance hinges on the carbon price and the 
commercial viability of carbon capture and storage technology, since Poland’s electricity generation is 
almost exclusively based on coal, even though it is planning to build a nuclear power plant that might 
be operational by 2020. The extent to which the Baltic countries could turn into competitive producers 
of electricity crucially depends upon the future of nuclear energy in Lithuania.
28   
                                                      
26 According to Nordic regulators, the principal reason for the net imports of Nordic countries was the low level 
of availability within Swedish nuclear power generation. 
27 As noted earlier, 2010 was a dry year in the Nordic countries. 
28 While Ignalina (with a capacity of 3,000 MW), the country’s only nuclear power plant, was shut down on 31 
December 2009, the new Visaginas nuclear power plant (with a capacity of 1,300 MW) could be in operation by 
the end of 2020. The supply situation in the Baltic countries will also be affected by the development of nuclear 
projects in Kaliningrad and Belarus. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 19 
4.  Potential for electricity trading in northern Europe 
This section first reflects upon geographically-specific benefits that could be associated with 
electricity trading in northern Europe, complementing the conceptual approach of section 2 and 
drawing from the analysis of section 3. Then, the limitations in current interconnection capacity 
between the Nordic and other northern European countries are discussed and interconnector projects 
that would allow for more electricity trading are presented. Internal grid issues that pertain to cross-
border trading and technological developments to keep in mind are discussed, as well as regulatory 
challenges that deserve the attention of policy-makers. 
4.1 Geographically-specific  benefits 
There are three geographically-specific benefits associated with electricity trading between the Nordic 
area and other northern European countries. 
First, electricity trading can enable the use of Nordic hydro capacity to be optimised from a European 
perspective. Currently, this benefit is related to the fact that hydropower in the Nordic market can 
complement the thermal-dominated mix in other northern European countries.
29 In the future, the 
flexible hydro capacity in Norway and Sweden will become more relevant, with a view to integrating 
a significant amount of the variable renewables that are being built up in northern Europe. To some 
extent hydropower could replace coal and gas in balancing variable wind power. While such 
substitution effects would not lead to lower carbon emissions, as the power sector is covered by the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), it could decrease the costs of pursuing decarbonisation objectives 
in general and of reaching the 2020 targets in particular. Electricity trading is also beneficial from a 
resource-efficiency perspective. For example, as hydropower inflows sometimes exceed reservoir 
capacity in Norway, exporting power during periods of high inflow may in these cases be the only 
alternative to spilling water. 
Second, the analysis of market developments provided in section 3 demonstrates that developments 
are quite heterogeneous across northern Europe. Owing to the increasing share of low-carbon 
electricity with low marginal costs in the Nordic countries (mainly driven by nuclear and wind 
capacity additions), which could result in excess capacity by 2020, power trading can be expected to 
exert downward pressure on wholesale electricity prices in other northern EU member states. It may 
also decrease the costs of decarbonisation (see the first benefit discussed above). It should be noted, 
however, that this could come at the expense of power companies with a concentration of their 
generation assets in countries that have opted out of nuclear power.
30 Also, consumers in the Nordic 
countries will face somewhat higher prices in the short term, even though analyses by P&T (2010) 
suggest that “the price-reducing effect of renewable generation is much stronger than the price 
increasing effect of new interconnector capacity”.
31  
Third, analyses by the OffshoreGrid consortium (2011) show that the spatial correlation of wind is 
generally lower in the north–south direction than east–west (see appendix 4). For example, correlation 
coefficients between the Nordic countries and Germany are quite low (44% for Denmark–Germany, 
6% for Finland–Germany, 30% for Sweden–Germany and 40% for Norway–Germany). By contrast, 
                                                      
29 Thermal-based systems (e.g. in Germany, the Netherlands and Poland) see large price differences between day 
and night, but are not so volatile across seasons. Hydro-based systems (e.g. in Norway and Sweden), by contrast, 
have more stable prices during the day and night, but seasonal and annual prices hinge upon precipitation levels. 
In this regard, the empirics of the NorNed cable are noteworthy. Depending on precipitation levels, the main 
direction of the commercial flow changes. According to the detailed statistics on electricity exchange by 
ENTSO-E, the Netherlands was a net importer from Norway in both 2008 (2.8 TWh) and 2009 (1.6 TWh). In 
2010, however, a dry year in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands became a net exporter to Norway (1 TWh). 
Put simply, in dry years Norwegian consumers benefit and in wet years the Dutch consumers do. Taking a 
multiannual perspective, both countries’ consumers benefit as they have lower average prices and less price 
fluctuation.  
30 See also section 5.2. 
31 This is due to the merit order effect of wind (Pöyry, 2010). 20 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
the correlation between Germany and the UK is 67%. As a consequence, north–south transmission 
infrastructure is particularly helpful for the integration of more wind energy in the northern European 
electricity grid and can contribute to reducing price volatility. 
The price differentials that continue to exist even in scenarios that assume significant additions to 
transmission capacity confirm the general case for more power trading in northern Europe (see 
appendix 5). 
4.2  Limitations in the current interconnection capacity 
While a great many interconnectors and internal transmission lines have an impact on power flows in 
northern Europe (see e.g. appendix 6), this study focuses solely on connections between the Nordic 
and other northern EU member states. This reduction of complexity seems necessary to allow for a 
meaningful discussion, and the isolation of the problem also makes sense given the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the Nordic electricity market outlined in section 3.  
Obviously, in the case of a Nordic power surplus, as discussed in section 3.7, electricity could only be 
exported if sufficient interconnection capacity was available. Table 3 shows the existing capacity 
between the Nordic countries and other markets. Denmark disposes of 2,250 MW export capacity to 
Germany. Finland is linked to the Baltic countries through the Estlink connection (350 MW). While 
Norway has a direct link to the Dutch market, the capacity is currently limited to 700 MW. Sweden 
has direct access to the German market (a capacity of 600 MW) as well as to Poland (600 MW). In 
short, in total 4,500 MW of export capacity to other EU member states is available. This means that a 
maximum of 39 TWh could be exported in the hypothetical case that the entire capacity was used for 
exports 24 hours a day, all year long. While this is obviously not feasible given that demand varies 
throughout the day and across seasons, cables may be out of order and so forth, even such a rough 
calculation shows that export estimates of up to 46 TWh require significant investment in transmission 
infrastructure.  
Table 3. Existing interconnectors (Nordic countries to other markets) 
Countries Stations  Name  Voltage  Capacity  (MW) 
From To        (kV) Export  Import 
Denmark  Germany  Kassø – Audorf     2 x 400~  1,500  950 
Kassø – Flensburg    220~  –  – 
Ernsted – Flensburg    220~  –  – 
Ernsted – Flensburg    150~  150  150 
Bjæverskov + Rostock  Kontek  400=  600  600 
 Subtotal           2,250 1,700 
Finland  Russia  Imatra – GES 10     110~  0  100 
Yllikkälä – Viborg    2 x 400~  0  1,400 
Kymi – Viborg    400~  –  – 
Nellimö – Kaitakoski    110~  0  60 
Estonia  Espoo – Harku  Estlink  150=  350  350 
 Subtotal       350 1,910 
Norway  Russia  Kirkenes – Boris Gleb     154~  50  50 
Netherlands   NorNed  450=  700  700 
 Subtotal          750 750 
Sweden   Germany  Västra Kärrstop – Herrenwyk  Baltic Cable  450=  600  600 
Poland  Starnö – Slupsk  SwePol Link  450=  600  600 
  Subtotal           1,200 1,200 
Nordic  Total           4,550  5,560 
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Importantly, price levels will not always be higher in the Nordic countries. For example, when the 
wind is blowing strongly in northern Germany but lightly in the Nordic countries, power flows may 
well go the other way around. Thus, interconnection capacity will not only be needed for exports from 
the Nordic countries to other markets, but also to reap the benefits associated with power trading 
outlined in section 4.1. Owing to the large-scale, variable electricity-generation capacity that is 
currently built up in the EU – especially in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – investment in 
transmission infrastructure is also necessary to ensure the cost-effective integration of variable RES-E 
in the northern European electricity grid. This applies to interconnection projects as well as to internal 
grid reinforcements (see also section 4.3). 
Limitations in the current transmission infrastructure likewise become evident if one looks at 
congestion rents. Supponen (2011) reports congestion rents for 28 European countries.
32 In 2008 and 
2009, the congestion rents for the 12 northern European countries under study amounted to €843 mn 
and €472 mn, respectively. For the Nordic countries alone, congestion rents were €351.3 mn (2008) 
and €137 mn (2009). The 2009 figures are lower, stemming from a general decrease in electricity 
demand leading to less congestion at price zone borders. 
4.3 Interconnector  developments 
Apart from the NorNed2 cable, which was postponed, all of the projects presented in Table 4 could in 
principle be operational before 2020. This means that by 2020, 8,750 MW of additional transmission 
capacity could be available between the Nordic countries and the northern EU member states. 
Transmission capacity could thus easily more than triple between now and 2020, allowing a 
significant increase in power trading. At the same time, the table shows that many of the projects are 
still uncertain, because of the various barriers to investing in transmission, as later discussed in section 
5.  
While most of the interconnectors presented in the table are classic point-to-point interconnectors, the 
characteristics of interconnectors will change in the future. Innovative, combined grid solutions to 
connect offshore wind farms could be built with an integrated interconnector. Spare capacity could 
then be used for trade. Kriegers Flak, expected to be operational sometime between 2018 and 2020, is 
an example of a hub-to-hub solution that could affect the cross-border capacity, while the main driver 
would be the integration of wind power. Up to 900 MW of interconnector capacity could be available 
between Germany and Denmark for trade in situations where it is not used by a wind farm. Sweden 
might join at a later stage (50Hertz et al., 2010).  
The OffshoreGrid (2011) project assessed several innovative options concerning how to better 
integrate wind energy into the northern European electricity grid.
33 While a detailed discussion of 
these options would go beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that efforts should be 
made to ensure that integrating offshore wind and fostering more electricity trading go hand in hand. 
                                                      
32 Only one aggregate figure per country is reported, even if more than one TSO operates in the respective 
country. 
33 These are wind farm hubs (i.e. “the joint connection of various wind farms in close proximity to each other, 
thus forming only one transmission line to shore”), tee-in connections (i.e. “the connection of a wind farm or a 
wind farm hub to a pre-existing or planned transmission line or interconnector between countries, rather than 
directly to shore”) and hub-to-hub connections (“the interconnection of several wind farm hubs, creating, thus, 
transmission corridors between various countries”). All definitions are from OffshoreGrid (2011). 22 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
Table 4. Selected, planned interconnector projects between Nordic and other northern European countries 
Countries Name  Capacity  Year  Cost  est.  Owner/operator Additional  information 
From To    (MW) (est.) (€  mn)       
DK  DE  Reinforcements I  500  2012  NA  Energinet.dk and TenneT  Cost estimate only available for the Danish share 
of reinforcements (€8 mn); an aggregate figure is 
estimated 
DK  DE  Reinforcements II  500  2017  NA  Energinet.dk and TenneT  Own cost estimate 
DK DE  Krieger's  Flak  900  2018–20  1,200  50Hertz Transmission (Elia), 
Energinet.dk 
600 MW HVDC, 300 MW AC; capacity only 
available for trade if not used by wind farms; 
Sweden might join at a later stage; own cost 
estimate based on a feasibility study 
DK  NL  COBRAcable  700  2016  456  TenneT, Energinet.dk  Subsea HVDC 
FI  EE  Estlink2  650  2014  320  Fingrid and Elering  Subsea HVDC 
NO  DE  Nord.Link  1,000  2018–21  1,544  Statnett and TenneT  Subsea HVDC; regulated investment 
NO DE  NorGer  1,400  2016?  1,400  Statnett  Subsea HVDC cable; the Commission did not 
grant an exemption as a merchant line; the future 
is uncertain 
NO  NL  NorNed2  700  >2021  683  Statnett and TenneT  Subsea HVDC, postponed as Statnett prioritises 
projects with Germany and the UK 
NO  UK  NSN  1,000  2018–21  1,740  National Grid and Statnett  Subsea HVDC, possibly a wind farm connection 
mid-way (Dogger Bank) 
NO UK  NorthConnect  1,400 <2020  1,740  Agder Energi, E-CO, Lyse, SSE 
(Scottish and Southern Energy), 
Vattenfall AB 
Subsea HVDC; capacity might be extended to up 
to 2,000 MW; merchant; own cost estimate based 
on an NSN project 
SE LT  NordBalt  700  2015–16  553  Svenska kraftnät, LITGRID 
Turtas AB 
Subsea HVDC 
      Total 9,450           
Note: For investment cost estimates in currencies other than €, the following exchange rates were applied: DKK 1 = €0.13, NOK 1 = €0.13, SEK 1 = €0.11; in cases of contradictory 
estimates, the most recent one is reported. 
Sources: ENTSO-E (2010, 2011a), P&T (2010), the reports of national regulators and press releases of project developers.  THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 23 
 
4.4 Internal  congestion 
Notably, cross-border interconnections are not the only challenge for grid planners. As stated in the 
European Commission’s Communication on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond, 
“offshore development will strongly influence the need for reinforcements and expansion of onshore 
networks” (European Commission, 2010b). In the German case, for example, wind power capacity 
and new conventional power plants are mainly located in the north, while demand rises mostly in the 
south. Thus, huge north–south transit capacity is needed, as stressed by the dena grid studies (2005, 
2011). Similarly, hydro reservoirs are concentrated in the north of Sweden, while centres for 
consumption are in the south. This leads to significant price differences among different bidding areas 
in Sweden. 
In cases where there is an absence of multiple bidding areas within countries (Germany and Austria, 
for example, are single price zones), internal bottlenecks are not transparent. To create a constituency 
for an internal grid extension, it may be helpful to create more bidding zones in countries where 
structural bottlenecks exist. From the perspective of network operation, it makes most sense to form 
bidding zones “so that the congested parts of the network are at their outer borders and that inside the 
zones transmission from any generator to any load can be guaranteed with reasonable certainty” 
(Supponen, 2011). In addition, public reaction to the division of Sweden into four price zones on 1 
November 2011 may serve as anecdotal evidence demonstrating how valuable explicit price signals 
are to alert the public of where real congestion exists and to potentially trigger public support for grid 
extension. Still, a recent study commissioned by Bundesnetzagentur (Frontier Economics and 
Consentec, 2011) points to possible negative consequences arising from market splitting, as it might, 
for example, lead to reduced market liquidity, the increased market power of large electricity 
generators and reduced retail competition. 
Internal congestion can be one reason for the limited utilisation of interconnectors. OffshoreGrid 
(2011) reports an average utilisation of 64% for selected interconnectors between 2008 and 2010. 
Accordingly, a recommendation by the OffshoreGrid project is that the development of an offshore 
grid has to be complemented by adequate reinforcements of the onshore grid. On a general note it is 
safe to conclude that when it comes to establishing the internal market for electricity, both the 
domestic and European dimensions are inherently intertwined. 
4.5 Technological  improvement to existing lines 
Transmission expansion is not the only option to increase power flows: 
Novel and unconventional technologies can make better use of existing assets by increasing 
the capacity of the existing grid. FACTs devices (flexible AC transmission) and PSTs (phase 
shifting transformers) reallocate power flow away from heavily loaded routes to more lightly 
loaded ones and so make a more optimal use of the transmission assets. The capacity of 
overhead lines can be increased by reconductoring with high temperature low sag (HTLS) 
conductors, and/or by implementing flexible line management (FLM), also known as dynamic 
line rating, which adjusts the line rating depending upon the actual environmental conditions 
and the physical state of the conductors. (Timpe et al., 2010) 
Another possibility discussed at a CEPS stakeholder workshop, as a promising solution to make more 
out of existing lines, was AC to DC line conversion. Here, the EU could get involved by providing 
financial assistance to pilot projects. 
4.6   Regulatory challenges
34 
To make optimal use of new transmission infrastructure, successful completion of the internal market 
for electricity is essential. More precisely, market coupling with implicit auctioning is needed. Only if 
interconnection capacity is traded day-ahead and intraday, can the benefits of interconnectors be fully 
reaped. Yet this also requires that the technical features (including technical losses) of HVDC 
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interconnectors are properly modelled in the allocation process. Gate closure time as close to real time 
as possible would be desirable from the viewpoint of variable RES-E integration. Moreover, an 
optimised design of market regions could improve the investment signals for interconnectors. In 
particular, offshore areas should be included as noted by the OffshoreGrid project. 
Another major regulatory challenge lies in the integration of electricity balancing markets, as the 
traditional approach – i.e. performing balancing at the control-area level without sharing balancing 
resources – is not ideal in terms of either variable RES-E integration or the efficient use of available 
generation capacities. Nevertheless, given the highly complex nature of the subject (the practices of 
TSOs differ widely across Europe) this process will take time. The Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) is currently drafting framework guidelines for an EU code on balancing. 
Such a code should result in harmonised and integrated balancing markets throughout the EU.  
As discussed in section 3.8, in several member states there are doubts about whether sufficient 
investment in conventional generation capacity will take place. Zachmann (2011) notes that “Member 
States’ discussions show that those mechanisms risk being non-market based and incompatible across 
the Union”. Radical proposals go as far as suggesting that the market is replaced by a central purchaser 
model.
35 Apart from the direct threat such proposals may constitute for the internal market, the 
uncertainty surrounding the establishment of capacity mechanisms or market-wide interventions might 
induce potential investors to delay investment decisions, potentially resulting in a vicious circle.  
5.  Barriers to investment in transmission 
This section gives an overview of the major barriers that are relevant to transmission expansion in 
northern Europe. The recent European Commission proposal for a regulation on guidelines for a trans-
European energy infrastructure of 19 October 2011 (European Commission, 2011a), which addresses a 
number of these barriers, is discussed in the next section. 
5.1  Economic and financial barriers 
Investment in transmission infrastructure is challenging. Even though ENTSO-E’s first TYNDP does 
not “take full account of needed infrastructure investment triggered by important new offshore wind 
generation capacities in the Northern Seas” (European Commission, 2010c), it estimates that projects 
of European significance require investments of €50-70 bn between 2010 and 2025. KEMA 
calculations cited in the European Commission’s impact assessment accompanying the infrastructure 
blueprint suggest that “these projects would need to be operational in 2020 to reach the 20-20-20 
targets” (European Commission, 2010c). The impact assessment comes to the conclusion that the 
overall investment needs for electricity networks (including offshore and smart grids) amount to €142 
bn by 2020. Importantly, according to the European Commission, in a business-as-usual scenario only 
€45 bn of electricity infrastructure investment would materialise, although €90 bn is deemed possible 
under current market and regulatory conditions (ibid.). The European Commission’s estimates suggest 
that – even if authorisation issues are resolved (see section 5.1) – an investment gap of €60 bn remains 
by 2020, mainly as a result of “the non-commercial positive externalities of projects with a regional or 
European interest and the risks inherent to new technologies” (European Commission, 2010b). 
A Roland Berger study (2011a) on financing
36 identifies several key challenges, inter alia: 
•  delayed approval of transmission projects (up to ten years), which may cause additional costs that 
are hard to foresee ex ante (see next section); 
•  insufficient stability of the regulatory regime and remuneration of grid investments, also in light of 
the increased complexity of projects (e.g. offshore grid); and 
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competitive price-based investments of market players” (Hood, 2011). 
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•  the lack of competence and experience among some (especially smaller) TSOs in raising capital, 
as they have only recently emerged as separate companies owing to the unbundling requirements.  
The time lag of infrastructure investments and transmission capacity poses some problems as well. 
Grids need to be reinforced before new interconnectors and generators can be connected. This might 
increase network tariffs (and consequently electricity prices) in the short run because congestion rents 
– which could be used to lower tariffs – would materialise only at a later stage. According to 
RealiseGrid, the current regulatory approach does not balance short-term and long-term interests well 
(Urbani et al., 2011). 
There is also a lack of clarity about future capacity developments, as in many cases it is unclear how 
the EU’s transition to a competitive low-carbon economy will unfold in practice. This further 
complicates cross-border cost allocation, given that the distribution of costs and benefits among 
countries also depends on future developments.  
Generally, it is important to stress that improving the incentives for investing in transmission should 
not be reduced to a discussion on rates of return. A reliable and stable regulatory regime might well be 
able to attract sufficient capital at relatively mediocre rates of return owing to its low risk for investors. 
For example, stranded investments are borne by consumers. 
5.2  Political and administrative barriers 
To build a new regulated interconnector between two countries, both sides must be willing to proceed 
with the project. Investment in transmission suffers from a lack of coordination among member states 
and other relevant actors (ministries, regulators, TSOs, project promoters, etc.). Importantly, “the 
current policy does not address permitting issues, market or regulatory failures, the mismatch between 
national and European priorities and the need for strong political support” (European Commission, 
2010c). 
With regard to permitting procedures, a study by Roland Berger (2011b) commissioned by DG Energy 
identifies a number of challenges: 
•  the lack of a single institution that would be ‘responsible’ for the permitting procedures; 
•  a permit process that is not transparent enough; 
•  the lack of an effective monitoring and reporting system, as well as clearly defined measures to 
speed up delayed procedures; 
•  the involvement of stakeholders too late in the process; and  
•  authorities lacking sufficient capabilities. 
In view of the integration of offshore wind energy, one current barrier consists of the often-
incompatible schemes for the support of renewables. Within the current regulatory framework, 
connecting an offshore wind farm to two or more countries could in many cases create problems in 
terms of obtaining financial support (OffshoreGrid, 2011). 
The well-known NIMBY issue represents a serious caveat with a view to political support, as 
opposing infrastructure projects may be an attractive option for vote-maximising politicians. Along 
those lines, ENTSO-E (2010) identifies the “lack of social acceptance by affected local communities 
and their representatives, or environmental organizations” as threatening “the timely completion of 
infrastructure projects and the achievement of European policy targets”. Delay is not the only problem 
that may result from public opposition – infrastructure costs might also increase if more expensive 
solutions (such as underground cables in lieu of overhead power lines) are needed to ensure public 
support. This should be incorporated into the analysis on costing. 
Interconnector projects could face strong opposition in some countries with a strong anti-nuclear 
movement, such as Germany, if they allow for the large-scale import of nuclear energy. Nuclear plays 
an important role in Sweden and Finland’s power mix (see section 3). German producers might oppose 
interconnection projects with the Nordic countries because of the likely downward pressure on 26 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
domestic electricity prices. If the UK eventually decides to build new power plants, interconnection 
capacity could also be used to export nuclear energy from the UK to the continent.  
The classical barrier to investment in transmission – and arguably one of the many reasons why no 
interconnector has yet been built between Norway and Germany – is that it has a differential impact on 
prices. In other words, interconnector projects might well increase overall welfare but still not be in 
the interest of consumers in low-price zones. As a consequence, regulators or other relevant actors on 
this ‘losing’ side of the interconnector might oppose such an investment (Urbani et al., 2011). But the 
massive deployment of RES-E in many northern European countries and the resulting more dynamic 
differences in price will make it clearer that enlarged markets are a win–win situation in the long run. 
The effective unbundling requirements of the third energy package should further complement this. As 
of 30 September 2011, however, the Commission has opened infringement procedures for non-
communication of national transposition measures against 17 member states. Only the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland and Portugal have 
communicated about their transposition so far. 
Merchant projects for investment in interconnectors face specific legal barriers. Even though they 
represent a special category of grid users, they are normally not mentioned as a separate category in 
national laws and regulations. In Sweden, pure merchant projects are not possible, as the dominant 
participation of the Swedish TSO is required by national law. 
5.3 Technical  barriers 
There are no insurmountable technological obstacles to transmission expansion. Yet the integration of 
offshore wind into the electricity grid poses some technical challenges. An integrated solution, such as 
a meshed offshore grid that could integrate offshore wind more cost-effectively, requires technological 
developments in the field of direct current breakers and multi-terminal control systems (European 
Commission, 2010c; see also OffshoreGrid, 2011). Generally, a lack of standardisation of HVDC grid 
technology is slowing down progress. 
Technical barriers are more relevant when seen from a financing angle. Projects making use of new 
and innovative technologies come along with first-mover risks. As investment in transmission is 
usually borne by consumers, regulators are understandably concerned about taking these risks. In 
practice, however, this may imply that suboptimal standard solutions are preferred to innovative 
technological options (European Commission, 2011b). 
6.  Overcoming the barriers 
This section focuses on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on guidelines for a 
trans-European energy infrastructure of 19 October 2011 (European Commission, 2011a). It also 
briefly discusses the energy roadmap 2050 of 15 December 2011. 
6.1  Key corridors for northern Europe – Projects of common interest 
On 19 October 2011, the European Commission proposed a regulation on guidelines for a trans-
European energy infrastructure (European Commission, 2011a). The proposal contains measures to 
reduce risks and accelerate network deployment. While the regulation only applies to certain “energy 
infrastructure priority corridors and areas”, with regard to electricity projects in northern Europe the 
definition is broad enough for almost all the relevant cross-border projects in northern Europe to be 
eligible in principle under the regime of ‘common interest’.  
At the heart of the proposal are the PCIs, which would benefit from i) streamlined and faster permit-
granting procedures, ii) improved cost-allocation procedures leading to longer-term incentives, and iii) 
access to EU funding through the ‘Connecting Europe’ facility.  
a)  Accelerated permit granting means that the projects would receive priority status at the national 
level. Early and better consultation of the public is also part of the proposal and should help THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 27 
address the NIMBY problem.
37 The introduction of a national one-stop shop and the inclusion of 
an ambitious three-year time limit should speed up the process considerably. 
b)  Establishing standards for cost-benefit analysis should facilitate cost allocation and the 
investment decisions of regulatory authorities for projects with cross-border impacts and provide 
incentives for a grid extension that follow long-term objectives. It remains to be seen, however, if 
member states will be able to agree on cost allocations based on such disputable criteria as the 
generation of regional or EU-wide positive externalities (Art. 13.5c). As discussed in section 2, 
there is considerable room for interpretation as to what constitutes a positive externality.  
c)  PCIs could also benefit from access to EU support through the Connecting Europe facility – more 
than half of the €9.1 bn the facility dedicates to energy infrastructure is expected to be available 
for electricity projects. While this funding opportunity can make a contribution to some 
particularly convoluted projects and also help to incentivise innovative technological solutions, 
the scale of the investment challenge identified in the preceding section makes it clear that a large 
chunk of investment needs to come from other sources.  
Electricity projects would be prioritised based upon a methodology for analysing the costs and benefits 
for the entire electricity system, to be developed by ENTSO-E. While there would be significant 
regulatory oversight and both ACER and the European Commission would be involved in the process, 
it would still be a challenging task. This holds especially true as demand- and supply-side 
developments beyond 2020 are still very uncertain. Cost-benefit analyses can only be as good as the 
input assumptions – and the considerable political, economic and technical uncertainty associated with 
the EU’s transition to a competitive low-carbon economy cannot be ‘calculated away’.  
As the regulation foresees that regional groups would be in charge of identifying projects within each 
priority corridor, some bottom-up dynamics within a competitive framework are ensured. The 
effectiveness of the selection procedure also depends on the openness of the process to third-party 
project developers.
38 One would imagine that each regional group has an interest in clearly identifying 
the benefits of a certain project to ensure having as many priority projects as possible. This could lead 
to some healthy competition. ENTSO-E could then weigh these benefits, taking into account the 
European perspective (with the support of the European Commission and ACER). Some 80-120 
projects are expected to eventually receive priority status (ENTSO-E’s 2010 TYNDP contained 
roughly 500 projects).
39 
With regard to the electricity corridor that is priority no. 1, the ‘Northern Seas Offshore Grid’, it seems 
important to note that there is a certain risk that too much coordination will slow down progress. 
While coordination is certainly important and will help drive down costs, as concluded by 
OffshoreGrid (2011), it is at least equally important that investors who want to take risk can go ahead.  
                                                      
37 A noteworthy initiative that inter alia aims at going ‘beyond public opposition’ and brings together both TSOs 
and NGOs is the Renewables Grid Initiative. On 10 November 2011, ten European NGOs, nine TSOs and five 
supporters signed the European Grid Declaration on Electricity Network Development and Nature Conservation 
in Europe. 
38 When it comes to establishing a truly integrated, European electricity market, the role of merchant lines can 
only be seen as a temporary solution, because congestion needs to be preserved in order to guarantee an adequate 
rent extraction and make merchant lines profitable (Urbani et al., 2011). In cases where the alternative is either 
the construction of a merchant interconnector of limited capacity and no interconnector at all, the former option 
is still interesting. A mixed solution that is discussed with regard to the Nemo interconnector is a cap and floor 
regime. In this regime, consumers would benefit from a cap, as all revenues above a certain threshold would 
have to be socialised. Project developers would be reassured by a floor, which would guarantee a minimum 
return on investment (Ofgem and CREG, 2011). 
39 According to Art. 2.3 of the proposed regulation, “‘project’ means one or several lines”, while the TYNDP 
works with a narrower definition of project. Nevertheless, at a CEPS workshop held on 28 November 2011 a 
European Commission official indicated that one would carefully assess the extent to which the project 
definition was circumvented to make sure prioritisation is not watered down. 28 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
6.2  Towards a coordinated policy on European energy? 
On 15 December 2011, the European Commission (2011c) adopted the energy roadmap 2050, which 
argues in favour of greater coordination on energy issues “to ensure that national decisions are 
mutually supportive and avoid negative spillovers”. The debate following the release of this roadmap 
should seek to make it explicit that the completion of the internal electricity market has to be 
accompanied by a coordination of national energy policies.  
The roadmap recognises the added value that is provided by the work of the North Seas Countries’ 
Offshore Grid Initiative.
40 But it does not yet provide clarity on the 2030 horizon. The discussion of 
five ‘decarbonisation scenarios’ demonstrates how difficult a robust cost-benefit analysis of grid 
extension is. Greater clarity with a view to the 2030 targets as well as in terms of the decarbonisation 
pathway would be helpful for optimising planning for transmission expansion. 
7. Policy  conclusions 
This section presents the main conclusions of the study in light of the European Commission’s 
proposal on a trans-European energy infrastructure. 
1. Transparent discussion is needed about the challenges of developing a cost-benefit analysis 
covering the entire electricity system. 
Owing to the complexity of a true, European cost-benefit analysis – which has not been done before – 
it is ambitious to expect ENTSO-E to submit its methodology for an energy system-wide analysis only 
a month after the proposed regulation enters into force. It has to be clear that the results of a cost-
benefit analysis as envisaged in the European Commission’s proposal of October 2011 can only be as 
good as the assumptions. This is further complicated by the fact that the cost-benefit analysis would 
need to serve two distinct purposes. First, it would be the basis for the selection of PCIs; second, the 
cost distribution among TSOs (or other project developers) would be decided on the basis of these 
calculations.  
a)  Generally, the assumptions underlying cost-benefit analyses should be as transparent as possible. 
Only if the basis on which projects of common interest are selected and the costs allocated among 
TSOs is agreed upon, can stakeholder and public acceptance be fostered. In particular, it is clear 
that the results of such a cost-benefit analysis vary greatly depending on the value attached to the 
various energy policy goals. While different options for integrating variable renewables exist (e.g. 
storage, supply- and demand-side responses), they do not necessarily serve the internal market 
goal as well as building interconnectors. These political choices behind a cost-benefit analysis 
have to be addressed – they cannot be solved in a technical process among experts. 
b)  With regard to setting European strategic priorities, a long-term approach looking 20 or 30 years 
ahead and assessing the long-term contribution that specific projects can make to EU policy goals 
is certainly justified. But for such a cost-benefit analysis, a coherent long-term EU energy policy 
would be crucial. Here, the energy roadmap 2050 is an important stepping stone. In the longer 
term, a more honest discussion about member states’ energy mix can hardly be avoided. Trans-
European energy infrastructure does, of course, have implications for member states’ energy mix. 
An effective EU energy policy requires coordination of member states’ energy choices. 
                                                      
40 In northern Europe, high-level political support for significant grid extension exists, as evidenced by the North 
Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI). The signatories, namely the governments of Benelux 
countries, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the UK and Norway, as well as the Commissioner for 
Energy, all declare that they “will identify and tackle barriers to grid development at both national, regional and 
EU-level, in particular regulatory, legal, market, planning, authorisation and technical issues” (NSCOGI, 2010). 
The initiative is supported by ACER, the relevant, national regulatory authorities and ENTSO-E. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 29 
c)  For the second purpose (i.e. cost distribution among countries) shorter time horizons are more 
appropriate, as it is hard to imagine that national regulators will be willing to accept cost-
allocation decisions that are based on a long-term cost-benefit analysis that necessarily includes a 
large number of ‘heroic’ assumptions. 
2. Effective governance of regional groups must be ensured. 
The involvement of regional groups as discussed in the proposed regulation is crucial. This holds true 
not only because of the challenges associated with a system-wide cost-benefit analysis, but also 
because of the need to ensure the support of all the relevant stakeholders. Only if the stakeholders are 
properly involved in the prioritisation process will they support the implementation of PCIs. 
Therefore, in the proposed regulation it would be desirable to further clarify the governance of 
regional groups, particularly the following aspects: 
a)  The process for identifying PCIs should be open to a large number of parties to present promising 
projects. This point stems from the sheer scale of the challenge of transmission investment that lies 
ahead. It implies that instead of relying entirely on TSOs, third-party project developers should be 
allowed to present merchant projects. To reduce administrative obstacles, it would be helpful if 
merchant project developers could present the relevant exemption by the European Commission 
and the national regulatory authorities once their project has been identified as being of ‘common 
interest’. 
b)  A specific issue that could contribute to better governance of regional groups would be the 
involvement of European coordinators in the identification phase. In the European Commission’s 
proposal of October 2011, a European coordinator is only envisaged if a PCI encounters 
implementation difficulties (Art. 6). But what happens if a regional group cannot agree on PCIs? 
As a consequence, consideration could be given to amending Art. 6 and allowing European 
coordinators to become involved in the identification phase as well. There should be careful 
assessment, however, of whether this would add an unnecessary bureaucratic burden.  
c)  As all four of the priority electricity corridors foreseen in the proposed regulation are of relevance 
for electricity trading in northern Europe, it is clear that optimised transmission expansion can 
only succeed if the regional actors cooperate closely. It is up to the Commission, ACER and 
ENTSO-E, which are all envisaged as participants in the regional group phase, to ensure that 
effective coordination among the groups takes place in practice. 
d)  The need for the close involvement of regulators already at the regional group stage as foreseen by 
the proposed regulation can hardly be overstated, given that regulators decide on the incentives for 
investment by TSOs. Regulators thus have to be convinced that the prioritisation of certain 
projects is indeed justified so that they are motivated to take the appropriate measures.  
3. Internal grid issues should not be overlooked.   
More than half of the projects outlined in ENTSO-E’s TYNDP are cross-border connections and this 
share is expected to increase to some two-thirds by 2030. Yet in practice, internal transmission 
capacity within European countries represents a substantial obstacle to more electricity trading in 
Europe. It is therefore important that the regime of common interest proposed by the European 
Commission does not just focus on cross-border issues, as these investments might become stranded if 
internal congestion prevails. The Commission’s proposal of October 2011 recognises this, but the 
point should be stressed further. As the proposal now enters the legislative process, it is important that 
this aspect is strengthened and not removed because of subsidiarity concerns.  
4. The scale and urgency of the infrastructure challenge requires significant further progress in the 
regulatory field well beyond establishing a regime of common interest. 
a)  Given the scale and urgency of transmission infrastructure development, it is vital to ensure that 
efforts to promote infrastructure investment are not limited to PCIs. In terms of regulatory 
incentives for investment by TSOs, a more holistic approach is needed, going beyond discussions 
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may carry very low risks, since consumers pay for investments. The challenge rather lies in 
incentivising the right kinds of investments, with solutions crucially depending on the regulatory 
framework within member states, which should be predictable and transparent. More specifically, 
the regulatory framework for congestion management should encourage the investment needed for 
both RES-E integration and the completion of the internal market for electricity. Merchant projects 
for new interconnectors should have a fair opportunity for development.  
b)  To make optimal use of the new transmission infrastructure, EU-wide market coupling of day-
ahead and intraday markets is important and needs to be implemented by 2014 as targeted. As 
mentioned with regard to the first conclusion above, it cannot be neglected that this development 
has implications for member states’ energy mix. More coordination is therefore required to make 
certain that the regulatory frameworks are compatible (inter alia, renewable support schemes) in 
order to promote fair and efficient competition in a European power market. It should also be 
ensured that the capacity mechanisms that a number of member states are planning to introduce do 
not distort the establishment of an internal market for electricity. 
c)  Another major regulatory challenge lies in integrating electricity balancing markets, as the 
traditional approach – i.e. performing balancing at the control-area level without sharing balancing 
resources – is not ideal in terms of either variable RES-E integration or the efficient use of 
available generation capacities. This will hopefully be achieved through the development of an EU 
code for balancing. 
d)  With regard to the development of an offshore grid, new models for cooperation among 
governments, TSOs and regulators are needed. Progress has to be made in terms of ensuring 
compatible support schemes for RES-E, among other things. The North Seas Countries’ Offshore 
Grid Initiative is an important means for making further advances on these issues.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Capacity and generation in the Nordic countries 
Table 5.  Installed capacity of electricity generation plants and power station generation in the Nordic 
countries (2010) 
 Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden  Nordic 
Net generating capacity as of 31 December 
2010 (MW)  13,375 17,081 31,780 35,701 97,937 
Nuclear    0 2,646  0 9,151  11,797 
Fossil  fuels  8,867 9,004 1,166 5,035  24,072 
Hydropower  9  3,133 30,164 16,200 49,506 
Other  RES  3,802 2,254  450 5,315  11,821 
Other sources  697  44  0  0  741 
Net generation in 2010 (TWh)  36.7  77  123.5 145 382 
Nuclear  0 21.9  0 55.6  78 
Fossil  fuels  26.3 31  5.3  7.8 70 
Hydro  0 12.8  117.3 66.2  196 
Other  RES  10.4 10.6  0.9 15.4  37 
Non-identifiable  0  0.7 0 0 1 
Source: ENTSO-E (2011b) (provisional values as of 30 April 2011). 36 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
Appendix 2. Estimates of Nordic electricity exports 
The second phase of the NEP project, which was financed by more than 20 organisations, inter alia 
Statkraft and DONG Energy, concludes that there are “huge opportunities for Nordic electricity export 
in a widened European electricity market”. While Denmark would become a net electricity importer, 
Norway and Sweden are anticipated to become large exporters to continental Europe in 2020; Finland 
would be a net exporter to the Nordic market. More precisely, if the renewable energy targets were 
fulfilled and new interconnectors built, results based on the European Econ Classic model indicate that 
net exports to Germany, Poland and the Netherlands would amount to around 30 TWh in 2020. The 
surplus is even greater if trade in European green certificates is assumed; however, doubts exist about 
whether this might become a reality.
41 Importantly, the Econ Classic model does not take into account 
that “the utilization of cables varies significantly between seasons and years” (NEP, 2010: 130). It 
should also be noted that the Econ Classic model makes the assumption that the electricity demand of 
the Nordic area would amount to 400 TWh in 2020 (NEP, 2010: 114). Thus, in the case of stronger 
demand (see Table 6), the estimated electricity surplus could decrease). 
In the report introduced in section 3.3, Pöyry Management Consulting and Thema Consulting Group 
(P&T, 2010) conclude that even if electricity demand in the Nordic countries grew considerably, there 
would be an electricity surplus, as long as investments in RES-E generation were not delayed 
substantively.
42 The highest electricity surplus, namely 46 TWh in 2020, is identified for the politics 
work scenario. In this scenario, Denmark would be a net importer in 2020 and the other Nordic 
countries net exporters. There are important assumptions for this model specification: 
•  5,350 MW of new transmission capacity from the Nordic to non-Nordic countries is installed by 
2020; 
•  the Nordic electricity demand amounts to 401 TWh by 2020; 
•  most EU member states participate in the market for green certificates from 2015 onwards; and 
•  the CO2 price remains fairly low up to 2020 (€18/ton of CO2). 
Thus, the order of magnitude of the results seems to depend on the (unlikely) successful 
implementation of a European scheme for green certificate trading. Yet the assumed capacity additions 
until 2020 more or less correspond to the figures presented in section 3.5. The second scenario that 
generates a significant surplus is the green growth scenario (23 TWh). Here, the assumed RES-E 
capacity additions are somewhat optimistic, given that Sweden, for example, is expected to dispose of 
7 GW of wind capacity but the NREAP only envisages 4.5 GW. The last surplus scenario (+ 28 TWh 
in 2020) is called “stagnation”. Here, the surplus is partly due to the relatively low Nordic demand 
(387 TWh in 2020) resulting from a period of low economic growth. Nevertheless, in light of fairly 
pessimistic assumptions (renewable targets would not be reached; only 3,250 MW of new 
transmission capacity would be available), the surplus is noteworthy. The only scenario for which 
P&T report a Nordic electricity deficit (-7 TWh) is the supply worries scenario. This worst-case 
scenario foresees a nuclear phase-down in Sweden (to 75% of current capacity) coupled with strong 
growth in demand.  
A study conducted by TSOs from the Baltic Sea region (BALTSO et al., 2009), namely NORDEL, 
PSE Operator S.A. and BALTSO, estimates that there is an export potential of roughly 14 TWh for the 
 
  
                                                      
41 Furthermore, the study reports high export potential (up to 50 TWh) for different specifications of the 
MARKAL–NORDIC model, but since all reported estimates are based on the assumption that an EU-wide green 
certificate trade is set in place, they are omitted here. 
42 The study was supported financially by a large number of major Nordic energy producers and consumers, 
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Nordic countries in 2025 in their climate & integration scenario. This specification entails the 
following key assumptions: 
•  the 20% emissions reduction target is reached by 2020;  
•  there is an increased share of electricity from RES;   
•  energy-efficiency measures are in place (lowering demand growth); and  
•  CO2 prices are €75/ton in 2025. 
With regard to this model specification, it should be noted that a CO2 allowance price of €75 is 
unlikely. Moreover, the surplus would amount to only 12 TWh if prices are low for electricity 
generated from RES, for example due to government subsidies. A nuclear phase-down  would, by 
contrast, result in a Nordic power deficit. In addition, the other two scenarios – business as usual and 
national focus – report small electricity deficits for the Nordic area. 
Table 6. Estimates of the Nordic export potential 
Source Scenario  Key  assumptions  Energy  model  Excess 
capacity 
estimates 
Assessment 
NEP 
(2010) 
Base scenario 
 
RES generation developed 
according to national 
policies; no certificate 
trading, RES target not 
fulfilled; new 
interconnectors are 
utilised; Nordic demand is 
~400 TWh (2020) 
The European 
Econ Classic 
model 
(developed by 
ECON Pöyry) 
and the 
Eureno model 
(a model for 
long-term 
European RES 
generation 
potential and 
costs) 
2020: +27 
TWh 
The highest export 
potential would 
only materialise if 
a trading system 
for European 
green certificates 
were to be 
established. 
No TGC 
(trade in green 
certificates) 
scenario 
 
EU RES target fulfilled 
without certificate trading; 
new interconnectors are 
utilised; Nordic demand is 
~400 TWh (2020) 
2020: +30 
TWh 
TGC scenario  
 
EU RES target fulfilled 
with full certificate trade; 
new interconnectors are 
utilised; Nordic demand is 
~400 TWh (2020) 
2020: +35 
TWh 
P&T 
(2010) 
 
 
Politics work 
 
Global climate agreement 
in 2018; most EU member 
states participate in a 
market for green 
certificates from 2015 
onwards; new 
transmission capacity 
from the Nordics to 
outside Nordics (MW) is 
5,350 (2020) and 6,450 
(2030); Nordic electricity 
demand (TWh) is 401 
(2020) and 440 (2030); 
CO2 prices (€/t) are 18 
(2020) and 30 (2030); oil 
prices ($/barrel) are 86 
(2020) and 87 (2030)  
Econ Pöyry 
BID model: a 
partial 
equilibrium 
model, with 
fuel prices, 
carbon prices, 
etc., given as 
input 
assumptions 
2020: +46 
TWh  
2030: +22 
TWh  
It is unlikely that a 
European green-
certificate market 
is going to be 
established by 
2015. 38 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
Table 6. cont’d 
P&T 
(2010) 
Green growth 
 
Global climate agreement 
in 2012; EU 2020 
emissions reduction target 
of 30%; new transmission 
capacity from the Nordics 
to outside Nordics (MW) 
is 5,350 (2020) and 7,050 
(2030); Nordic electricity 
demand (TWh) is 425 
(2020) and 472 (2030); 
CO2 prices (€/t) are 30 
(2020) and 45 (2030); oil 
prices ($/barrel) are 120 
(2020) and 134 (2030) 
 2020:  +23 
TWh  
2030: +22 
TWh  
A global climate 
change agreement 
is uncertain and a 
move to a 30% 
target in 2020 is 
unlikely.  
 Stagnation 
 
No global climate change 
agreement, demand 
stagnating, little 
investment in RES; new 
transmission capacity 
from the Nordics to 
outside Nordics (MW) is 
3,250 (2020) and 4,450 
(2030); Nordic electricity 
demand (TWh) is 387 
(2020) and 396 (2030); 
CO2 prices (€/t) are 15 
(2020) and 25 (2030); oil 
prices ($/barrel) are 52 
(2020) and 48 (2030) 
 2020:  +28 
TWh  
2030: +19 
TWh  
This scenario is 
interesting in light 
of the current 
economic 
situation, with 
higher investment 
in RES likely. 
Supply 
worries 
Nuclear phase-down in 
Sweden, strong demand 
growth, tight CO2 caps; 
new transmission capacity 
from the Nordics to 
outside Nordics (MW) is 
2,550 (2020) and 6,450 
(2030); Nordic electricity 
demand (TWh) is 420 
(2020) and 449 (2030); 
CO2 prices (€/t) are 30 
(2020) and 45 (2030); oil 
prices ($/barrel) are 120 
(2020) and 134 (2030) 
2020: -7 
TWh  
2030: -7 
TWh  
This is an 
important scenario 
as it shows that 
excess capacity 
hinges on the 
existence of 
nuclear capacity. 
BALTSO 
et al. 
(2009) 
Business as 
usual 
Enhanced market 
liberalisation; strong EU 
energy integration and 
coordination; market 
coupling; prices in 2025 
are $70/barrel for oil and 
€25/ton of CO2  
EMPS model: 
input data 
consist of 
consumption 
data (fixed and 
price elastic), 
generation 
data 
(including 
marginal 
costs) and 
transmission 
capacity data 
2025: -1 
TWh 
No excess capacity 
exists. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 39 
Table 6. cont’d 
BALTSO 
et al. 
(2009) 
Climate & 
integration 
20% emissions reduction 
target reached by 2020; an 
increased share of 
electricity from RES; 
energy-efficiency 
measures in place 
(lowering demand 
growth); strong EU 
integration; prices in 2025 
are $140/barrel for oil and 
€75/ton for CO2 
 2025:  +14 
TWh 
Sensitivity 
analyses reveal 
that the Nordic 
countries are net 
importers in the 
case of a nuclear 
phase-down.  
 
National focus  Weak EU integration; a 
national focus when 
solving problems of 
security of supply; prices 
for 2025 are $95/barrel for 
oil and €50/ton for CO2 
2025: -2 
TWh 
No excess capacity 
exists. 
Sources: NEP (2010), P&T (2010) and BALTSO et al. (2009). 
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Appendix 3. Market developments in other northern European countries 
Table 7 gives a quick overview of the extent to which member states have to integrate variable 
renewables. A more detailed discussion follows of the market developments introduced in section 3.8. 
Table 7. Variable RES-E capacity and projected peak demand in 2020 (MW) 
  Variable capacity  Peak demand 
   Wind Solar  Total   
Belgium 4,320  1,340  5,660  16,221 
Estonia 650  0  650  2,287 
Germany 45,750  51,753  97,503  74,000 
Latvia 416  2  418  1,700 
Lithuania 10  500  510  2,120 
Netherlands 11,178  0  11,178 21,750 
Poland 6,650  3  6,653  28,898 
UK   49,040  2,680  53,020  68,510 
Total 118,014  56,278  175,592  215,486 
Notes: Total variable values for the UK also include 1,300 MW of tide/wave/ocean capacity. The peak demand figure 
for the UK is for Great Britain alone. Hydro and biomass capacity is considered non-variable and thus is not included.  
Sources: NREAPs; Eurelectric (2010). 
 
In light of the nuclear phase-out, Germany currently plans to build new fossil-fuel generation capacity. 
More precisely, according to the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (GFMET 
2011), the idea is to construct 10 GW by 2020 on top of the capacity additions that are already under 
construction. At the same time, Germany is also committed to increasing its RES electricity generation 
capacity from 54 GW (2010) to 111 GW in 2020, in order to reach its sectoral RES electricity target of 
38.6%. This is expected to lead to an increase in RES electricity generation from 105 TWh (2010) to 
217 TWh in 2020 (ibid.). A large part is estimated to come from variable sources (41 TWh from solar 
and 104 TWh from wind). 
While new, conventional thermal generation is deemed to be needed to deal with variable RES-E, this 
might not be profitable without subsidies due to its low load factor, as preference is given to electricity 
coming from RES. A quick analysis of energy scenarios prepared on behalf of GFMET underlines this 
concern (EWI et al., 2010).
43 Gas-fired plants are projected to continue to play an important role in the 
electricity-generation capacity mix (20-42 GW in 2050, representing 12-23% of overall installed 
capacity), but their load factor will be quite low, as they are expected to serve mainly as a backup for 
variable wind energy. More to the point, full load hours of gas-fired plants are estimated to decrease 
from 3,183 (2008) to 1,614-1,849 h in 2020 and 0-1,666 h in 2050. Indeed, it might be difficult to 
attract private sector investment in the necessary infrastructure.  
Various studies predict that Germany will be a net electricity importer in the future. According to the 
energy scenarios by EWI et al. (2010), Germany will be a net importer as of 2030, since other 
countries are estimated to have a comparative advantage with regard to energy generation – either 
because of cost-effective nuclear capacity or greater RES potential. As a consequence, the study 
estimates net imports to range from 37 to 44 TWh in 2030 and 34-76 TWh in 2040 to 64-102 TWh in 
                                                      
43 Only those scenarios that assume a nuclear phase-out in the 2020s are discussed here (reference, I A, I B).  THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 41 
2050.
44 P&T (2010) estimate that Germany will import significant amounts of energy from the Nordic 
countries in both 2020 and 2030 in three out of four scenarios (up to 25 TWh). Similarly, Germany 
and the Netherlands are net importers by 2025 in all of the scenarios by BALTSO et al. (2009), with 
net imports ranging from 15 (in the national focus scenario) to 24 TWh (in the climate & integration 
scenario). 
P&T also estimates that the Netherlands alone is expected to be a net importer from both Norway and 
Sweden. Nevertheless, a recent TenneT report (2011) argues that the Netherlands have significant 
export potential, identifying post-nuclear phase-out Germany as a major destination market. This is 
based on the expectation that 14 GW of new generation capacity will become operational between 
2011 and 2018. Notably, in order to reach their RES-E 2020 target of 37% (2005: 6%), the 
Netherlands face the challenge of having to integrate additional RES capacity of more than 10 GW by 
2020 (with 2010 being the reference year), mostly consisting of variable wind energy. Thus, 
irrespective of the actual direction of trade flows, increased interconnection capacity would probably 
allow for a more cost-effective integration of RES-E in the Dutch grid.  
A press release by the Belgian regulator for electricity and gas, CREG, states that Belgian generation 
capacity will not be sufficient to meet domestic demand – in particular between 2012 and 2015. In the 
face of such a potential shortage, CREG recommends prolonging the life of those nuclear and fossil 
fuel power plants that are currently envisaged to be phased out in 2015. Belgium could meet its own 
needs again by 2020, but only if all planned projects are completed on time (CREG, 2011). Belgium 
also faces the challenge of RES-E integration, as its RES-E 2020 target is 21% (2010: 5%). This 
means that in 2020, 10.5 TWh of power generation will come from wind, with 11 TWh of generation 
expected to be based on biomass. The contribution of other RES to Belgian power generation will be 
negligible. 
Poland’s future electricity balance hinges on the carbon price and the commercial viability of carbon 
capture and storage technology, as Poland’s electricity generation is almost exclusively based on coal 
(Eurostat, 2011), even though it is planning to build a nuclear power plant that might be operational by 
2020. Not surprisingly, Poland is expected to be a net importer by 2025 (9 TWh) in the climate & 
integration scenario by BALTSO et al. (2009: 24), because that scenario assumes a carbon price of 
€75 per ton of CO2. Yet in scenarios with a lower carbon price, Poland’s trade balance is roughly even 
and no significant net trade takes place between Poland and the Nordic countries (BALTSO et al., 
2009; P&T, 2010). Poland’s RES-E 2020 target amounts to 19%. More than half of RES electricity 
generation in 2020 is projected to come from non-variable sources, namely biomass (14 TWh) and 
hydro (3 TWh). 
The extent to which the Baltic countries would be net importers of electricity crucially depends upon 
the future of nuclear energy in Lithuania. While Ignalina (with a capacity of 3,000 MW), the country’s 
only nuclear power plant, was shut down on 31 December 2009, the new Visaginas nuclear power 
plant (with a capacity of 1,300 MW) could be in operation by the end of 2020. Unless the nuclear 
plans fail, BALTSO et al. (2009) estimate that Lithuania and the Baltic countries in general will have a 
positive regional balance of electric energy by 2025, with the expected surplus ranging from 1 to 9 
TWh. Nevertheless, three out of four P&T scenarios suggest that Lithuania and Estonia will import 
around 8 TWh from the Nordic countries in 2020. RES-E integration is not a major issue from the 
Baltic countries’ perspective, since RES-E targets are either quite low (Estonia and Lithuania) or 
expected to be achieved by mainly making use of non-variable RES-E (Latvia).
45 
                                                      
44 Again, only those scenarios that assume a nuclear phase-out in the 2020s are discussed. Yet all scenarios (even 
those that assume some nuclear capacity to remain in place until 2050) predict a rising share of net imports for 
Germany (12-31% of gross energy demand in 2050; see EWI et al., 2010: 114). 
45 Lithuania’s RES-E target is 21% (2010: 10%). RES-E is estimated to total 3 TWh in 2020, to which wind and 
biomass contribute 1.3 and 1.2 TWh, respectively (NREAP for Lithuania). Latvia is committed to raising its 
RES-E share from 45% (2010) to 60% (2020). But the largest part of the total RES-E power generation of 5 
TWh would come from hydro (3.1 TWh) and biomass (1.2 TWh) (NREAP for Latvia). Estonia’s RES-E share 42 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
With regard to the UK, P&T’s scenarios do not indicate a clear trend in net trade; only in half of the 
scenarios is the UK expected to import moderately from Norway (up to 5 TWh in the 2020 scenario of 
politics work). But in a recently published White Paper, the UK’s Department of Energy & Climate 
Change warns that security of supply is in danger, as around 20 GW (~25%) of electricity generation 
capacity will be phased out over the next decade. The White Paper concludes that “up to £110 billion 
[~€127 billion] investment in electricity generation and transmission is likely to be required by 2020, 
more than double the current rate of investment” (UK Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011: 
27). 
In addition, a quick analysis of the UK’s NREAP reveals that in order to reach the 31% RES-E 2020 
target (2010: 9%), the UK is planning to rely almost entirely on variable wind generation. By 2020, 38 
GW of RES-E capacity is projected to be installed, of which 15 and 13 GW would be onshore and 
offshore wind, respectively. This means that in 2020, 88 TWh of the total RES-E generation of 117 
TWh would come from wind. 
Several joint ventures have been formed that seek to operate new nuclear power stations as early as 
2020 (EDF-Centrica, E.ON and RWE, and Iberdrola-SSE-GdF-Suez). Still, even if these consortia are 
able to overcome such likely obstacles as financing problems and public opposition,
46 new (inflexible) 
nuclear power plants would probably not be able to solve the challenge of integrating the UK’s 
significant additions in (variable) wind capacity.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
will remain below 5% even in 2020 (NREAP for Estonia). The supply situation in the Baltic countries will also 
be affected by the development of nuclear projects in Kaliningrad and Belarus. 
46 In addition, the Scottish government strongly opposes the construction of nuclear plants in Scotland. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 43 
Appendix 4. Wind power correlation in northern Europe 
Table 8. Correlation coefficients between countries using simulated wind-power time series for the 
OffshoreGrid 2030 wind-power scenario (includes both on- and offshore wind) 
Source: OffshoreGrid (2011). 44 | TEUSCH, BEHRENS & EGENHOFER 
Appendix 5. Estimates of future price differentials 
Table 9. Power prices in different P&T scenarios and countries (€ per MW) 
 
Source: P&T (2010). 
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Table 10. Range of price differentials in 2030 after different design realisations (base case, direct, hub-to-hub and meshed) of the direct design approach 
   BE  DE  DK  EE  FI  LT  LV  NL  NO  PL  SE  UK 
   Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max 
BE  -  -  4 4.6 6.3 9.7 6.4 8.4 11 24 6.9 7.2 6.4 8.1 3.3 7 16 18 6 6.3 11 26 4.6 9.4 
SE  11 26 10 24  5.5 17 2 7.3 4 21 4.9 21 4 21  8.9 21 5.6 8.8 7.1 22 - - 9.3 21 
FI  11 24 11 22  7 16 4 19 - - 6.1 19 0  1  7.3 8.1 9 13 3.7 5.6 4 21 10 20 
NO  16 18 15 16 10 10 5.7 9.9 9 13 10 13 9.2 13 13 15 - - 13 15 5.6 8.8 13 15 
DK  6.3 9.7 5.8 7.5  -  - 4.6 6.2 7 16 3 5.8 4 6.2 4.2 6.3 10 10 3.3 6.9 5.5 17 6.3 8.9 
UK  4.6 9.4 7.3 8.8 6.3 8.9 8.2 10 10 20 7.4 9.9 7.9  10 4.1 6.5 13 15 7.4 10 9.3 21 -  - 
EE  6.4 8.4 5.4 7.8 4.6 6.2 - - 4 19 1.2 2.7 0  1  10 21 5.7 9.9 8.4 21 2 7.3 8.2  10 
LV  6.4 8.1 5.4 7.3  4 6.2 0 1 0 1 1.2 1.8 -  - 6.8 8.1 9.2 13 3.7 4.7 4 21 7.9  10 
LT  6.9 7.2 5.4 6.3  3 5.8 1.2 2.7 6.1 19 - - 1.2 1.8 5.9 7.8 10 13 2.6 3 4.9 21 7.4 9.9 
NL  3.3  7 4.5 5.3 4.2 6.3 10 21 7.3 8.1 5.9 7.8 6.8 8.1  - - 13 15 5.4 7.2 8.9 21 4.1 6.5 
PL  6 6.3 4.4  5 3.3 6.9 8.4 21 3.7 5.6 2.6 3 3.7 4.7 5.4 7.2 13 15 - - 7.1 22 7.4  10 
DE  4 4.6  -  - 5.8 7.5 5.4 7.8 11 22 5.4 6.3 5.4 7.3 4.5 5.3 15 16 4.4 5 10 24 7.3 8.8 
Note: The table presents differences in price levels and not absolute price levels. 
Source: OffshoreGrid (2011).  
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Appendix 6. Selected interconnector projects in northern Europe 
Table 11. Selected interconnector projects in northern Europe 
Countries Name  Capacity  Year  Cost  Owner/operator  Additional  information 
From To     (MW) (est.)  (€  mn)       
GB  NL  BritNed  1,000  2011  600  National Grid and TenneT  260 km submarine cable, HVDC; merchant; 
operating since April 2011, with more cables planned 
by 2020 
SE  FI  Fenno Skan 2  800  2011  300  Fingrid and Svenska 
Kraftnät, 
HVDC subsea 
DK  NO  SK4  600  2014  443  Statnett and Energinet.dk  450/500 kV DC, regulated 
PL  LT  LitPol  1,000  2015-20  237  PSE Operator S.A. and 
Lietuvos Energija AB 
HVDC, overhead, to be completed in two steps 
SE  NO  Southwest Link  1,200  2016-17  -  Statnett and Svenska 
Kraftnät 
Combination of HVAC and HVDC 
BE  GB  NEMO  1,000  2016-18  -  National Grid International 
Limited (NGIL) and Elia 
Planned as cap and floor 
Sources: Same as Table 3. THE BENEFITS OF INVESTING IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION | 47 
 
Appendix 7. Financing the transmission infrastructure 
In principle, TSOs are responsible for investment in electricity infrastructure. Depending on the 
transmission infrastructure project, the share of TSO own resources ranges between 20% and 100% of 
the total investment (European Commission, 2010c). The remaining investment needed is usually 
covered by loans; additional capital may be provided by means of partnerships with power companies 
(ibid.). Cross-border electricity projects are often project-financed, meaning that a special purpose 
company is set up for an individual project (ibid.). While member states are usually not directly 
involved in financing (ibid.), most TSOs are controlled by member state governments (LBST and 
Hinicio, 2011).  
Electricity- and gas-transmission infrastructure projects of European interest (trans-European energy 
networks, TEN-E) are supported financially by the EU. Under the current legislative framework the 
following instruments are available (European Commission, 2010c):  
•  the TEN-E budget (€155 mn in 2007–13), with a maximum co-financing rate of up to 50% for 
studies and 10% of eligible costs for works (however, this usually just amounts to 0.01-1% of a 
project’s total investment needs); 
•  the European Investment Bank, through which €3.407 bn of senior loans were provided to 
electricity projects between 2007 and 2009;  
•  structural funds, with a total available sum of €1.33 bn (2007–13), of which, however, only a 
marginal part is allocated to electricity-related projects; and 
•  other EU sources, namely the European Energy Programme for Recovery (which expired on 31 
December 2010, with its remaining funds having been allocated to a new European Energy 
Efficiency Facility), instruments for pre-accession, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. 
The recent Commission proposal for the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014–20 
foresees a significant increase in the funds available for projects related to electricity infrastructure. 
Especially the proposed Connecting Europe facility (€40 bn in total, of which €9.1 bn is for the energy 
sector) would improve EU funding capabilities. Similarly, a European Parliament Resolution of 8 June 
2011 underlines that “energy’s share in the next MFF should increase” (European Parliament, 2011).   
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely 
recognised as the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European 
Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its 
strong in-house research capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner 
institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
•  Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, 
and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable 
analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable 
research institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ 
research expertise and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 